Gateway Access Monitor

In brief

33 slots a day in force for booking dates from 15 Oct (A-36), up from 32; Neopanamax draft 49.0 ft since 28 Sep (A-36); September Canal Waters Time 37.97 h, +8.8% on August (A-38); late-cancellation surcharge from four days before arrival since 15 Oct (A-37); record ≈US$5.3M auction premium (24 Aug, press-reported) stands.

What changed since the last edition

Direction by dimension (8 applicable) — Methodology §4 · what each measure means

• Nominal capacity — stable: The ACP's September operations summary (A-38) restates the maximum sustainable capacity, about 36–38 vessels a day, in the same words as August's (A-34).
• Effective capacity — improving (better): The ACP's total daily capacity rose from 32 to 33 transit slots for booking dates from 15 Oct (A-36), a whole-unit change; the 49.0 ft Neopanamax draft held and October's maintenance rows print a Panamax estimate of 23.
• Reservable capacity — stable: Booking slots offered are 33 a day for booking dates from 15 Oct (A-36; Neopanamax 10), the step the October edition recorded as announced; how many were booked comes with the ACP's October summary (~10 Nov).
• Waiting time — deteriorating (worse): September Canal Waters Time, 37.97 h (A-38), is 8.8% above August's 34.90 h, and unbooked waits, which bind the unreserved user, rose in both directions; October to date they are far lower, read in December.
• Cost of secured passage — stable: The ≈US$5.3M record auction premium (24 Aug, press-reported; confirmed to press by the ACP) stands: no higher outcome was reported through 29 Oct, and the ACP's own auction report prints none near it.
• Allocation rules — stable: A-40 (30 Oct) puts full container ships first for freed Neopanamax slots; A-37's Panamax pilot and A-39's alliance swaps for Supers apply to 2027 dates; only a booking guarantees a transit date: rewritten, not eased.
• Access uniformity — stable: Same rung (Rule-differentiated, published and observed): the 2027 terms sort by vessel class and bid, alliance membership bears only on transfers and swaps, and no published criterion names a flag, owner or nationality.
• Recovery flexibility — deteriorating (worse): Since 15 Oct the late-cancellation surcharge applies from four days before arrival, not two (A-37): stricter terms; A-39's Last-Minute service at the Panamax locks is discretionary, with no offering observed.

Daily capacity: stated, booking slots offered and ships observed

Nominal capacity

36–38/day

In force to 14 Oct (A-29)

32/day

From 15 Oct (A-36)

33/day

Observed transits (ACP daily reports, 1–28 Oct; 27 of 28 days, no report for 17 Oct)

33.4/day

Key figures and evidence

Each figure shows its evidence label; open it for the full text and its source, where linked.

• Canal Waters TimePrimary-publishedSeptember's average time in canal waters, 37.97 hours, was 8.8% above August's.

  37.97 h average in September (A-38-2026, 9 October), against the August 34.90 h (A-34) the October edition carried: up 8.8%, outside the methodology's 5% band. Monthly high 78.15 h, low 17.60 h; with the published average in-transit time of 11.59 h (high 12.73 h, low 10.24 h) taken off the 37.97 h average, the queue component averaged about 26.4 h (August about 23.6 h). The same summary counts 979 oceangoing transits in September, 32.63 a day (high 37, low 28): 149 vessels under 91 ft beam, 561 of 91 to under 107 ft and 269 Neopanamax (27.48%), about level with its own 2025 average of 33.1 a day and a different population from the ship-tracking (AIS) series in the traffic table. The October summary, expected around 10 November, is the next monthly measure.

  Evidence label: Primary-published — The authority's own published figure.

• Booking slots (A-36, in force for booking dates from 15 Oct)Primary-publishedSince 15 October the canal offers 33 booking slots a day, one more than before.

  For booking dates from 15 October 'until further notice', A-36-2026 (28 September) offers 33 slots a day — 30 booked plus 3 auctioned: Neopanamax 10 (9 + 1), Supers 18 (17 + 1), Regulars 5 (4 + 1) — up from the 32 a day A-29 offered for booking dates from 15 September; the Panamax locks' offer stays at 23 a day, and A-39-2026 (21 October) says the ACP 'has been able to sustain the number of transits being offered at the Panamax Locks'. A-39 repeats that 'While the water deficit in the Canal watershed persists, the Transit Reservation (Booking) System remains the only mechanism to guarantee a transit date' and that 'vessels without a reservation may experience extremely extensive delays'. How many of October's slots were booked will appear in the ACP's October summary (expected around 10 November); the daily reports' next-day bookings are a snapshot only.

  Evidence label: Primary-published — The authority's own published figure.

• Cost of secured passagePress-reportedThe press-reported record auction premium of about US$5.3 million, from August, still stands.

  Record ≈US$5.3M auction premium (auction 24 August; Bloomberg 25 August; confirmed to press as the highest ever by the ACP's then administrator-designate on 28 August) stands — no higher outcome was reported through 29 October in WRI's daily sweep of wire and trade press. The ACP's own auction report — a registered-access page giving the lowest, average and highest amounts by vessel size for rolling seven-day booking windows, in thousands and without a currency label — prints a highest amount of 2,401K (Neopanamax), in its windows of 2–8 and 3–9 October, across its windows from 30 September to 30 October; it is not a register of records. Prior record US$4.6M (~12 August). The LoTSA 2027 base prices — US$200,000 a slot in the Neopanamax competition of 17 November and US$60,000 in the first Panamax pilot of 24 November (A-37 and the ACP's terms of 1 October) — are minimum bids, not outcomes; the late-cancellation surcharge in force since 15 October is read under Recovery flexibility. Documented auction record below. Documented auction outcomes

  Evidence label: Press-reported — Reported in press; not published by the authority.

• Announced measuresPrimary-publishedSealed-bid competitions for 2027 slots are set for 17 November (Neopanamax) and 24 November (the first for the Panamax locks).

  A-37-2026 (5 October) offers long-term slot packages for transit dates 3 January–3 April 2027, each averaging three slots a day: a Neopanamax sealed-bid competition on 17 November and, for the first time at the Panamax locks, a sealed-bid pilot for Super-category vessels on 24 November; the ACP's LoTSA terms of 1 October set 36 packages (270 slots) at a base price of US$200,000 a slot for the first and 51 packages (288 slots) at US$60,000 a slot for the second; the outcomes fall after this edition. A-39-2026 (21 October) opens the swap and substitution rules between members of the same alliance, until now for Neopanamax vessels only, to Super-category vessels for booking dates from 3 January 2027; all other swap and substitution rules stay in effect. A-40-2026 (30 October) says the ACP will 'return to the previous allocation criteria' now that vessel traffic 'has since normalized', reversing 'a temporary measure introduced in July 2026': effective immediately, any Neopanamax slot that is cancelled or otherwise becomes available in Booking Periods 1A and 2 is allocated through a special competition in the order full container, LNG, LPG and car carrier/RoRo vessels, with TTA (when applicable) and then customer ranking breaking ties; and from 1 November, first-time transit vessels may enter the NetZero slot competition once the ACP has issued their preliminary admeasurement inspection, provided they meet the programme's other requirements. Panamax-locks maintenance (A-38, 9 October): the Miraflores west-lane culvert outage of 22 September–3 October and the 3 October works are listed 'Completed', works on 12 and 15 October 'Confirmed', and works on 21–22 October and 13–16 November 'Tentative', each row with an estimated Panamax capacity of 23. The maximum authorised Neopanamax draft stays at 14.94 m (49.0 ft), set by A-36 on 28 September 'effective immediately and until further notice'; the ACP's water-level indicator for transits beginning 29 October prints 49.0 ft for the Neopanamax locks and 39.5 ft for the Panamax locks.

  Evidence label: Primary-published — The authority's own published figure.

• Queue Planning Ratio (supplementary)DerivedSeptember's worst day implied a queue about two and a half times the average day's, close to August's reading.

  September reading 2.52 (bracket 2.48–2.57; August 2.46, bracket 2.39–2.50): the month's worst published day implied a queue about two and a half times the average day's — worst-day queue ≈66.6 h against an average ≈26.4 h, computed from the ACP's published Canal Waters Time (37.97 h average, 78.15 h high) and In-Transit Time (11.59 h average; 10.24–12.73 h). The change on August, +0.06, is under the 0.1 threshold and is not read as movement. All vessels (booked and non-booked). QPR series (CSV)

  Evidence label: Derived — Computed by WRI from primary figures by a stated method.

• Booking-slot utilisation by class (administrative population, monthly)Primary-publishedIn September booked transits came close to, or above, the slots the canal counts as available.

  September (A-38): Neopanamax 134 booked transits against 125 slots available (107.20%), Supers 428 of 435 (98.39%), Regulars 92 of 96 (95.83%) and auctioned slots 291 of 339 (85.84%); August 175 of 178, 472 of 561, 124 of 150 and 204 of 227. The 'available' counts fell from August (Neopanamax 178 to 125, Supers 561 to 435, Regulars 150 to 96): part of that fall reflects A-29's cuts to the September offer (Neopanamax 9 a day and Panamax 25 from booking date 4 September; Panamax 23, total 32, from 15 September), but the size of the fall is not the size of the cut, because the ACP's 'available' count is a narrower administrative population than the slots offered. The ACP's 'available' excludes additional auctioned slots and its 'used' covers booked transits only — not a capacity-utilisation rate, and it carries no direction.

  Evidence label: Primary-published — The authority's own published figure.

• Waiting timePrimary-publishedWaits rose in September; the canal's own figures for October so far show much shorter waits for ships without a booking.

  The latest monthly authority measure, September Canal Waters Time (A-38), reads 37.97 h against the August 34.90 h the October edition carried — up 8.8%. The ACP's board of average waiting times for non-booked transits ('the hours between the underway time and the ready time') rose in both directions in September: 113.8 h northbound and 75.0 h southbound, from 83.2 h and 19.0 h in August (July 47.1 h and 32.9 h). October to date the same board, refreshed 30 October, reads 23.2 h northbound and 47.1 h southbound — far below September; the figure is month to date and revisable. On the ACP's daily customer reports the queue at 00:01 had a median of 60 vessels on 28 September–14 October and 57 on 15–29 October (no report for 17 October), and WRI's medians of the daily average Canal Waters Time by lock class read Neopanamax 20 → 19 h, Super 20 → 21 h and Regular 32 → 20 h (transit days 28 September–14 October against 15–28 October); the changes of 15 October, A-39 on 21 October, maintenance in both windows and the M7.7 earthquake of 9 October all bear on these moves, so none is credited with them. The direction reads the completed months the edition compares, September against August, in which the unbooked figure rose with Canal Waters Time; October's Canal Waters Time comes with the ACP's October summary (~10 November), and October, with the board's full-month figure, is read in the December edition. The daily reports' class averages are a different measure from the monthly Canal Waters Time and are never combined with it.

  Evidence label: Primary-published — The authority's own published figure.

• Transits: the canal's own count (ACP daily reports)DerivedThe canal's daily reports count 33.4 transits a day in October to the 28th, more after 15 October than before.

  The ACP's daily customer reports count 902 transits on the 27 transit days from 1 to 28 October with a report — no report was posted for 17 October, so 16 October is missing: 33.4 a day (WRI's mean; ACP daily reports, 1–28 October), the observed line in the capacity ladder until the ACP's October summary (~10 November). The daily count is close to, but not the same as, the summary's monthly count of oceangoing transits: on the 24 September days with a report it averaged 33.04 a day, against the summary's 32.63. Transits can exceed the booking offer because ships without a booking also transit. Between 28 September–14 October (17 days) and 15–28 October (13 days with a report) the daily count rose from 32.5 to 34.3 a day: Neopanamax 8.9 → 9.4, Super 17.5 → 18.7, Regular 6.1 → 6.2. Four changes took effect on 15 October — A-36's 33rd slot and its Neopanamax booking rules, A-37's late-cancellation surcharge and Panamax maintenance listed 'Confirmed' — and A-39 followed on 21 October; Panamax works fall in both windows (the culvert outage to 3 October and the works of 3 and 12 October before, works listed 'Tentative' for 21–22 October after), and an M7.7 earthquake struck Panama on 9 October (US Geological Survey), a day with 33 transits on the ACP's report; none of these is credited with the movement.

  Evidence label: Derived — Computed by WRI from primary figures by a stated method.

• Transits: ship tracking (AIS)DerivedThe ship-tracking count this page uses at every chokepoint has caught a smaller share of Panama's traffic since August.

  The ship-tracking (AIS) series this page uses at every chokepoint — the headline figure and the traffic table — reads 27.3 a day for 1–25 October against 28.1 for September (−2.8%), month to date and provisional. Since August it has run at a smaller share of the canal's own count of oceangoing transits (87% in August and 86% in September, below the 90–96% of every month from March 2024 to July 2026), for reasons not yet known; the October share needs the ACP's October summary.

  Evidence label: Derived — Computed by WRI from primary figures by a stated method.

• Access uniformityPrimary-publishedThe rules still sort ships by vessel class, cargo, booking and price, not by flag, owner or nationality.

  Rule-differentiated (both): the published rules differentiate by locks and vessel class, cargo segment (full container, LPG, LNG, vehicle carriers/RoRo/bulkers/other), TTA capacity range, booking period and tier, customer ranking and willingness to pay. For the 2027 window the ACP's LoTSA Panamax terms (version 1.0, revision of 30 October) open the sealed bid to 'any customer with a valid Customer Code', limit it to Super-category vessels (not Panamax Plus, Full Daylight Restricted, tug-and-barge or non-self-propelled vessels), offer packages by market segment and direction, award by bid amount with ties decided by bid time, and make the slots transferable to other customers only if they are LoTSA Panamax customers or operate within an alliance (term 5); A-37 says the pilot is intended for fixed-itinerary customers and those whose customer-ranking position makes regular booking harder — a stated target, not an eligibility rule. A-39 extends to Super-category vessels, from booking date 3 January 2027, the rules of Notice to Shipping N-07 for swaps and substitutions between members of the same alliance that until now applied to Neopanamax vessels only; all other swap and substitution rules stay in effect. No published criterion names a flag, owner or nationality. Gatekeeper: ACP.

  Evidence label: Primary-published — The authority's own published figure.

• Recovery flexibilityPrimary-publishedLate cancellations now draw the surcharge from four days before arrival instead of two; a last-minute booking service is reinstated at the original locks, offered at the canal's discretion and not yet observed.

  Since 15 October the ACP applies its late-cancellation surcharge (tariff 1050.IBC9): 250% of the reservation fee, on top of the cancellation charges, for cancellations received four days or less before the required arrival time and for vessels that fail to arrive within seven days after that time — 'temporarily' and 'until further notice' (A-37-2026, 5 October). A-37 presents this as a reduction from the seven days A-28 announced, which A-32 postponed before it took effect; its own table lists the current term as two days, so the cancellation terms are stricter, and the ACP's tariff notes (revision of 1 October) describe the change as an increase of 'the threshold from 2 to 4 days'. A-39-2026 (21 October) reinstates the Last-Minute Reservation service at the Panamax locks with immediate effect — a second announcement, for the Panamax locks, after A-36 rule 12 for the Neopanamax locks — to be offered under Notice to Shipping N-07 'when a slot becomes available and the ACP, at its sole discretion, decides to offer such slot': announced, not observed, as no ACP document read for this edition records an offering at either set of locks. At the Neopanamax locks, substitution by a vessel of the same or greater TTA capacity, swaps between vessels of the same TTA capacity and booking-date changes within the weekly segment allocation continue (A-36 rules 10–11). Published rules only; no privately arranged workaround is read as a direction.

  Evidence label: Primary-published — The authority's own published figure.

• Advisory count (automated title screen)DerivedAn activity count of the canal authority's advisories on access terms, not a count of rule changes.

  22 ACP advisories in 2026 to the 27 October 2026 retrieval of the ACP's advisory index whose titles carry booking, transit, draft, condition, surcharge, slot, auction, reservation, modification or cancellation terms, monthly operations summaries excluded — an activity count from an automated screen of the titles as the index lists them, not a count of rule changes; titles without those terms are not captured (A-29-2026 is not counted). 2025: 14; 2023: 34. Advisories counted (CSV)

  Evidence label: Derived — Computed by WRI from primary figures by a stated method.

• Fiscal year 2026 (ACP release; context)Primary-published

  Context, kept apart from the monthly figures: the ACP's release of 21 October gives 13,951 transits for its fiscal year October 2025–September 2026, up 4.1% from 13,404, and 521 million Panama Canal Universal Measurement System (PC/UMS) tons, up 6.5% from 489.2 million. The release does not define the count; WRI reads it, from the ACP's own traffic tables, as the total including small craft, until the ACP publishes its fiscal-year 2026 tables.

  Evidence label: Primary-published — The authority's own published figure.

• WatchPrimary-publishedGatun Lake rose through October, but a strengthening El Niño and a dry forecast for November and December keep water the constraint to watch.

  Hydrology remains the binding constraint. Gatun Lake rose through October on the ACP's daily level history, from 85.03 ft on 1 October to 86.57 ft on 28 October, and the official level for transits beginning 29 October is 86.6 ft; on the official level, which is what the ACP's projection projects, the lake read 85.7 ft for transits beginning 15 October and 86.2 ft for 21 October — 0.1 ft below and 0.2 ft above the 85.8 ft and 86.0 ft of the 29 September projection the October edition printed. Its 1–28 October mean on the daily history (85.74 ft) is still about 0.9–1.6 ft below the same days of 2021, 2022, 2024 and 2025. On the ACP's 20-station rainfall series, 2026 rain at the series' 30 October label (rain to 29 October) is 95.1% of the 1991–2020 climatology (93.4% at the 30 September label), and rain between the two labels was 105.1% of the norm for those days. NOAA's Climate Prediction Center keeps its El Niño Advisory (8 October): 'El Niño continues to strengthen, with a strong-to-very strong El Niño likely through January-March 2027 (remaining greater than an 83% chance)'; its weekly update of 26 October repeats the monthly statement that 'El Niño is present'. Panama's IMHPA, in its November 2026 bulletin (No. 59), forecasts November rainfall below normal for most of the country and December rainfall normal over much of the Pacific slope and below normal elsewhere. Open: the ACP's October operations summary (~10 November), with October Canal Waters Time, oceangoing transits, slots offered and used and the status of the 21–22 October works; any Last-Minute offering at either set of locks; the Panamax works listed for 13–16 November; the LoTSA 2027 competitions of 17 and 24 November.

  Evidence label: Primary-published — The authority's own published figure.

Reported auction prices

Documented auction outcomes (record, not a series — carries no direction)

Outlook

In brief

~57% of pre-crisis traffic (1–25 October, provisional), 6.9% above September and sustained to the cut-off; Cape diversion +68% over reference; COSCO/OOCL and MSC services back through Suez beside four more Gemini passages (tracker, observed); CMA CGM Pantheon's passage of 13 October also SCA-recorded; no attack on shipping in the Red Sea or Bab el-Mandeb since 24 August (UKMTO), one piracy-related attack in the Gulf of Aden on 17 October; war-risk differentiated by affiliation, no quotation newer than 24 September (press-reported).

What changed since the last edition

Direction by dimension (7 applicable) — Methodology §4 · what each measure means

Not applicable here, so not counted: reservable capacity.

• Nominal capacity — stable: The SCA's stated capacity stands: its Arabic and French pages give 97 standard ships a day as the capacity reached with the 2015 expansion, and its 13 Oct release says it takes 100% of the container fleet.
• Effective capacity — improving (better): 43.2/day for 1–25 October (provisional) against 40.4 in September, a 6.9% rise outside the 5% band; the 7-day rolling mean held at or above September's mean on all 25 days, meeting the 14-day test.
• Waiting time — stable: Convoy terms stand, no SCA circular since 28 Sep: a ship arriving after the 23:00 limit may still join for a surcharge of 5–12% of normal dues, otherwise waits about 24h; the escort queue gives no measure.
• Cost of secured passage — stable: Conflict: carriers added Suez charges on cargo (ONE's new charge, 13 Oct; MSC's extension in force 19 Oct, as announced), but war-risk cover, which binds passage, has no quotation newer than Reuters' 24 Sep levels.
• Allocation rules — stable: SCA convoy rules stand (newest circular 28 Sep), MARAD 2026-013 stays active and Aspides still has more requests than ships (EEAS, 20 Oct); an age-25 inspection rule is press-reported, not an SCA circular.
• Access uniformity — stable: Same rung, same governing rule: the Houthi blockade on Saudi-linked shipping was declared on 20 July (MARAD 2026-013, JMIC; UKMTO: announced 22 July), and the HOCC's index shows no maritime notice in October.
• Recovery flexibility — improving (better): Rerouting options widened again: tracked October passages show COSCO/OOCL and MSC services back through Suez and four more Gemini passages, one passage SCA-recorded (CMA CGM Pantheon, 13 Oct).

Key figures and evidence

Each figure shows its evidence label; open it for the full text.

• TransitsDerivedOctober traffic to date runs above September's, outside the 5% stability band, and the rise has held to the data cut-off (provisional).

  43.2/day for 1–25 October (IMF PortWatch, 25 of 31 days; provisional) against 40.4 in September (complete month) and 75.3 at the June-2023 reference — about 57% of normal. The rise on September (6.9%) is outside the edition's 5% stability band, the 7-day rolling mean sat below 80% of the September level on 0 of 25 days, and the 7-day rolling mean held at or above September's mean on each of the 25 days to the cut-off, which meets the methodology's 14-day test for a sustained rise: read as improving. The October figures are provisional until the full-month PortWatch vintage lands; the canal authority's own quarterly count (below) is a different population and is not compared with this series.

  Evidence label: Derived — Computed by WRI from primary figures by a stated method.

• SCA quarterly countPrimary-publishedThe canal authority's own count rose 13.1% from the second to the third quarter of 2026, with container-ship transits up 47.7% (WRI's arithmetic).

  The Suez Canal Authority's quarterly statistics now include the third quarter of 2026, the latest authority figure: 4,050 transits in July–September (2,009 southbound, 2,041 northbound), including 598 container ships, with net tonnage of 203,762 thousand tons. On WRI's arithmetic that is 13.1% more transits than the second quarter's 3,580 (11.9% more per day, the third quarter having one day more) and 23.6% more than the third quarter of 2025 (3,277); container-ship transits were 47.7% above the second quarter (405) and 35.6% above a year earlier (441). The SCA counts every vessel it handles by its own ship classes, passenger ships and 'others' included, so this count is not comparable with the PortWatch series (five ship types) and is not compared with it.

  Evidence label: Primary-published — The authority's own published figure.

• The diversion mirrorDerivedTraffic round the Cape of Good Hope stays far above its pre-crisis level and close to September's (provisional).

  Cape of Good Hope traffic 86.7/day for 1–25 October (provisional) vs 51.6 at the June-2023 reference (+68%) — the rerouted cohort, visible daily; +0.7% against September's 86.1, inside the band.

  Evidence label: Derived — Computed by WRI from primary figures by a stated method.

• Bab el-MandebDerivedTraffic through the strait at the Red Sea's southern entrance rose on September's level but has not yet held above it long enough to read as sustained (provisional).

  28.1/day for 1–25 October (provisional), 5.6% above September's 26.6 (just outside the 5% band), but the 7-day rolling mean's current run at or above September's level is only 7 days to the cut-off, short of the 14-day test for a sustained rise; about 37% of the 76.5 reference, with the 7-day rolling mean below 80% of the September level on 0 of 25 days.

  Evidence label: Derived — Computed by WRI from primary figures by a stated method.

• Nominal capacityPrimary-publishedThe canal authority's Arabic and French pages give its capacity as 97 'standard ships' a day — a unit of convoy capacity, not a count of vessels.

  The SCA's Arabic and French New Suez Canal pages give 97 standard ships a day as the canal's capacity reached with the 2015 expansion, against about 77 before it; its English page gives 97 as a target for 2023. A standard ship is the SCA's unit of convoy capacity, not one vessel: in the SCA's own description a very large ship can take the time of three. Its Canal Characteristics page gives the shares of the fleet that the 66-ft permissible draft takes fully loaded — 61.2% of tankers, 92.7% of bulk carriers and 100% of container ships and other ships — and its release of 13 October calls the canal capable of accommodating 100% of the global fleet of container ships. Because the 97 counts convoy slots rather than vessels, the Monitor sets no transit count against it.

  Evidence label: Primary-published — The authority's own published figure.

• Reservable capacityPrimary-published

  Not applicable — the SCA allocates passage through two daily convoys with published limit times, not through a daily offer of booking slots, so there is no slot offer or booked share to read.

  Evidence label: Primary-published — The authority's own published figure.

• Allocation rulesPrimary-publishedThe canal's convoy rules and the US advisory line stand; escort ships, not the canal, still limit protected passage at Bab el-Mandeb.

  Two daily convoys with published limit times (SCA Navigation System page; Circular No. 5/2015): southbound from 03:30 and northbound from 04:00, direct transit, with a 23:00 limit time of arrival at Port Said (southbound) and Port Tewfik (northbound); no SCA circular since Periodical No. 29/2026 of 28 September amends these terms. The US advisory line is stable: MARAD Advisory 2026-013 (Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb, Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea and Somali Basin) runs from 23 September to 22 March 2027 and MARAD's piracy advisory 2026-010 to 4 February 2027; its two new advisories of 21 October are global. JMIC (Update 109, 29 October) keeps the southern Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden at SUBSTANTIAL and the northern Red Sea and Suez at MODERATE, says Bab el-Mandeb “remains open to commercial traffic but is considered as volatile” and that Suez Canal operations remain normal. Escort capacity, not the canal, still binds protected transits at Bab el-Mandeb: in a statement to the European Parliament on 20 October (the EEAS page names no speaker), the EU said “we have a huge list of companies requesting our support and not enough ships to help all who request it”, that member states' pledges of more frigates “are very important, but we need to get those ships to sea”, and that a liaison officer from Aspides will go to the Saudi-led coalition “to ensure coordination and avoid duplication”. Italy's defence minister said on 2 October that new Aspides contributions from some European countries were welcome but “not yet sufficient” (ministry statement, WRI translation), and told Parliament on 8 October that two, probably three, more European nations were expected to formalise naval assets for the operation (parliamentary record, uncorrected draft; WRI translation). On 26 October the EU High Representative said Aspides “helps to keep cargo and oil flowing through the Red Sea” and thanked France, Italy and Greece for their contributions. None of these statements gives ship numbers; press-reported only, diplomats told Reuters on 2 October that six warships were deployed. Also press-reported, single-source and not among the SCA's published circulars: Splash247 reported on 15 October that the SCA's Movement Department had told shipping agents that vessels aged 25 years and over must pass an inspection and trials before permission to transit — an age condition, a class rule rather than an identity test.

  Evidence label: Primary-published — The authority's own published figure.

• Cost of secured passagePress-reportedWar-risk insurance remains the price of passage, with no quotation newer than late September's; carriers have added Suez surcharges on cargo.

  The access price is war-risk insurance, differentiated by affiliation; no Red Sea war-risk quotation newer than the press-reported levels of 24 September was found, primary or wire. Those levels (Reuters, 24 September; four unnamed industry sources and one named broker) split by the vessel's Saudi connection: Saudi-linked tankers calling at Yanbu around 3% of a vessel's value, calls at ports south of Yanbu as high as 7%, and tankers transiting the Red Sea with no Saudi connection typically 0.2–0.3%; Reuters notes there is no public data for agreed rates. The Lloyd's market's Joint War Committee, which publishes no premium level, last reviewed its listed areas in September and moved its Red Sea notification line northwards after the Houthi announcement on Saudi ports and Saudi-linked vessels. The canal's own dues carry temporary surcharges in force since 15 July 2026 — 12% of total transit dues for container ships (SCA Circular No. 2/2026); 37% laden and 27% ballast of normal dues for crude and product tankers (Periodicals 16 and 17/2026, up from 25% and 15%) — and its direct-voyage rebates run to 31 December 2026. Carrier charging rules on Suez-routed cargo, not realised costs and never summed: ONE's Suez Canal Transit surcharge of US$18 per 20-foot and US$36 per 40-foot container on Asia–Europe services from 13 October (30 October on trades under the US Federal Maritime Commission and for Canada), and MSC's Piracy Risk Surcharge (US$55/TEU) and Suez Canal Surcharge (US$36/TEU), extended from 19 October (proforma date) to cargo from Asia for Derince, Port Said West and 43 West Mediterranean, Adriatic and North African ports (announced 30 September). Market context (third-party estimates): the Drewry World Container Index fell 3% to US$4,429 per 40ft container on 29 October, and Xeneta's market-average spot rates on 23 October were US$3,698 per 40ft from the Far East to North Europe and US$4,442 to the Mediterranean.

  Evidence label: Press-reported — Reported in press; not published by the authority.

• Access uniformityPrimary-publishedAccess still depends on a ship's affiliation: the Houthi blockade on Saudi-linked shipping, declared in July, stands.

  Identity-conditional (both). The authorities that track the measure date it: MARAD (Advisory 2026-013) says the Houthis “declared a blockade on Saudi-affiliated shipping transiting the Bab el Mandeb on July 20, 2026”, and JMIC (Update 109, 29 October) that Houthi messaging frames the 20 July maritime blockade as selective against assets considered Israeli-, Saudi- or Yemeni internationally recognized government-linked; UKMTO dates the blockade announcement to 22 July. MARAD names vessels with an Israeli, US, UK or Saudi association, and any vessel in a fleet whose company has been identified as making port calls in Saudi Arabia, as likely at higher risk. UKMTO assesses that the current threat to shipping “appears to be in line with the published blockade on Saudi-linked shipping” (VRA Overview Report No. 13, 30 October), and JMIC reports Houthi statements that non-Saudi commercial shipping may transit safely. Houthi published criteria name Israel-, US- and UK-affiliated vessels; the Houthi-run Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center's index shows no maritime notice in October — its October items warn air operators about Saudi airports and airspace, and its latest maritime item is the Sana'a foreign ministry's statement of 15 September that navigation in Bab el-Mandeb remains safe (party publications: evidence of what the party says, not of conditions at sea). Underwriters price by affiliation (the war-risk levels under Cost of secured passage), and the Lloyd's market's Joint War Committee moved its Red Sea notification line northwards after the Houthi announcement on Saudi ports and Saudi-linked vessels. Gatekeepers: Houthi forces, war-risk underwriters, Lloyd's JWC/LMA, EU Aspides, SCA.

  Evidence label: Primary-published — The authority's own published figure.

• Security recordPrimary-publishedUKMTO records no attack on shipping in the Red Sea or Bab el-Mandeb since 24 August; one piracy-related attack in the Gulf of Aden on 17 October.

  Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb: UKMTO records no attack on shipping since 24 August — 65 days to 28 October — and six attacks on shipping in the Red Sea this year (VRA Overview Report No. 13, 30 October); JMIC (Update 109, 29 October) also dates the last confirmed Houthi attack on a merchant vessel to 24 August. The only UKMTO warning in the Bab el-Mandeb area in October, 151-26 (Suspicious Activity, reported 4 October), records a tanker “sighting multiple explosions in close proximity” 60 nautical miles south of Al Mukha, crew safe; UKMTO assesses it as spillover from the land conflict rather than intentional targeting, and JMIC (Update 103), which counted it among the period's “confirmed attacks or disruptions”, as a probable intercepted aerial threat with no attribution confirmed. Reported separately, outside UKMTO's count (press-reported): a French frigate shot down a drone deemed threatening near the container ship CMA CGM Champs Elysees in the Bab el-Mandeb on the night of 1 October (the French armed forces general staff to Le Monde; single-source); shots were fired by a small craft at the container ship CUL Klang (as identified by security consultants) in the southern Red Sea on 7 October, crew uninjured (reports to the EU-sponsored Maritime Security Centre Indian Ocean, as carried by The Maritime Executive, which notes earlier reports that such small boats may be fishing boats protecting their nets); and a French escort ship intercepted a ballistic missile near the Belgian minehunter Primula near Bab el-Mandeb on 13 October (the French armed forces general staff to Le marin, 27 October, confirming Belgian press reports; a naval vessel, not merchant shipping). Gulf of Aden: on 17 October at 10:30 UTC a skiff with seven people fired two shots at an LNG tanker, whose armed security team fired two warning shots before the skiff altered course; no injuries or damage were reported. UKMTO classes it as an attack (warning 176-26) and counts it among piracy-related incidents (VRA Overview Report No. 12), and places it 140 nautical miles south-west of Al Mukalla, at 12°54'N 047°55'E; JMIC's Update 106 gives the bearing as south-east; the Monitor uses UKMTO's position. On 28 October UKMTO advised of several sightings of suspicious small craft near merchant vessels in the Gulf of Aden, one 'a green and blue boat with two ladders and one hook with 9 persons onboard' (advisory 184-26; no attack reported). Control of the Bab el-Mandeb coast is contested: JMIC says Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces launched a counter-offensive in early October and claim gains in the strait's approaches, with the extent of control “contested and unverified by independent sources”, and UKMTO likewise reports conflicting accounts. On UKMTO's own count, Bab el-Mandeb transits remain 24% below their level before the Houthi blockade announcement of 22 July.

  Evidence label: Primary-published — The authority's own published figure.

• Recovery flexibilityThird-party estimateA ship arriving after its convoy's limit time can still join it for a published surcharge, and rerouting options widened again in October.

  Within the canal, a ship that arrives after its convoy's 23:00 limit time may still join that convoy against a surcharge on normal transit dues: 5% (at most SDR 12,500, in Special Drawing Rights) for arrivals between 23:00 and 00:00, 10% (at most SDR 25,000) between 00:00 and 01:00, and 12% (at most SDR 30,000) after 01:00 if the convoy situation permits; container ships berthed at Port Said East must be ready by 00:00, then pay 10% to 01:00 and 12% after (SCA Circular No. 5/2015) — a charging rule, not a measured waiting time. A ship that misses its convoy waits about 24 hours for the next, as each direction has one convoy a day. Read on rerouting options, as the methodology provides where no booking system exists, the month widened them again: four more passages of the Gemini return were completed, COSCO/OOCL's LL1 service and MSC's westbound Indusa return made Suez transits. Hapag-Lloyd's chief operating officer said that three of its liner services had resumed passage through the Suez Canal and that further services on the Far East trade route were expected to return (as reported in the SCA's release of 30 October), and Maersk's chief operating officer was quoted by the SCA (release of 20 October) as anticipating the return of all the group's services to the canal by March 2027 — an expectation as quoted, not a sailing announcement; further returns are announced for November and later (passages and announcements below). The overland bypass behind the Red Sea export terminal is back to a stated capacity of 5.8 million barrels a day (the Saudi energy minister, press-reported; below) — a capacity statement, not an observed loading rate, and read for direction only at the Strait of Hormuz.

  Evidence label: Third-party estimate — An attributed external estimate.

• Service reversions (October passages)Third-party estimateThe ten October passages on this page's record carried the return beyond the Gemini network; one is also recorded by the canal authority.

  Passages this page tracked in October (ship-tracking records, UTC times, one signal class; no SCA record unless stated): four more passages of the Gemini return were completed — Cornelia Maersk northbound on 1 October (03:08–12:21), Antonia Maersk and Marchen Maersk northbound on 3 October (04:50–13:58 and 05:07–14:34) and Maersk Halifax southbound the same day (04:29–13:41); COSCO's OOCL Spain transited northbound on 5 October (03:26–12:51), one day after the date Linerlytica had given for COSCO's first westbound Suez voyage in more than two years, and reached Gdansk on 26 October; MSC Domna X, the first sailing MSC named for its westbound-only Indusa return, transited northbound on 7 October (02:46–12:27) and reached Charleston on 26 October; the mega container ship CMA CGM Pantheon made her first canal transit southbound on 13 October (03:37–13:00 by tracker) — the only October passage on this page's record also recorded by the SCA (release of 13 October); OOCL Felixstowe transited southbound on 19 October (03:25–12:35), was in the Red Sea on 21 October (18.49N 39.90E at 20:42 UTC) and was in the Laccadive Sea on 29 October (6.72N 76.66E at 04:10 UTC), so she has passed Bab el-Mandeb, the crossing itself not observed; the LNG carrier Al Kharsaah, which press reports describe as carrying a Qatari cargo bound for Poland, transited northbound on 22 October (04:37–14:09), her Bab el-Mandeb crossing not tracked (the tracker's first Red Sea entry is 19 October; press reported her in the Red Sea on 18 October); and OOCL Germany (LL1, eastbound) transited southbound on 26 October (03:07–12:14). Maastricht Maersk and Maersk Halifax, which passed Suez southbound on 28 September and 3 October, have since reappeared in Asian waters, closing their Bab el-Mandeb legs; the crossings themselves were not observed. Passages are not services, and each is recorded at the grade its evidence supports.

  Evidence label: Third-party estimate — An attributed external estimate.

• Carrier networks (announced, not yet observed)Primary-publishedMore returns are announced for November and later; ONE's FE1 and IOX services, the Premier Alliance's MD1 and MS2, the new SE5/AE18 service and the first SE1/AE12 sailing had made no Suez transit by 30 October.

  ONE's FE1 service (first Suez-routed voyage ONE Continuity 0079W, estimated at its first loading port, Laem Chabang, on 17 October) and IOX service (ONE Reliability 0021W, Karachi, 19 October), announced back on the Red Sea and Suez route on 29 September, had made no Suez transit by 30 October: ONE Continuity was still in South-East Asia and ONE Reliability was bound for Karachi (ship tracking). ONE says the Premier Alliance's MD1 and MS2 Asia–Mediterranean services will return to the Red Sea and Suez Canal route from the YM Trust's voyage 0106W (estimated at its first loading port, Ningbo, on 10 November) and the ONE Synergy's voyage 003W (Qingdao, 16 November) (advisory of 22 October). Hapag-Lloyd announced on 21 October a new Asia–West Mediterranean service, SE5, routed via the Suez Canal in both directions, first vessel Maersk Edirne at Shanghai on 22 November (Maersk lists the service as AE18; its rotation names no Suez Canal), and revisions to its SE1–SE4 services adding Port Said or Damietta calls, from 13–17 November at their first ports (Hapag-Lloyd's dates; Maersk's differ by up to three days). Maersk's network update of 19 October sets a new AE12 rotation through the Suez Canal with Port Said East and Colombo calls from 12 January 2027 (Alva Maersk, voyage 652E, at Colombo) and adds Jeddah to ME2 from 20 December (Maersk Tukang, 649E). Umm Qarn, named for the first SE1/AE12 Suez sailing (westbound 642W, Tanjung Pelepas departure scheduled for 27 October), had not reached Tanjung Pelepas on 27 October (tracker estimate of arrival 1 November, crew-entered), so her first Suez transit falls after this edition. On OOCL's LL1 schedule of 30 October, OOCL Spain's call of 5 October is still the only westbound Suez call among the 16 sailings shown; eastbound, Suez calls are listed from OOCL Felixstowe (19 October) onward, with OOCL Spain's next Suez call scheduled for 16–17 November (operator schedule; not observed). Announcements are not passages, and each is recorded at its rung.

  Evidence label: Primary-published — The authority's own published figure.

• Red Sea bypass (East-West pipeline / Yanbu)Press-reportedSaudi Arabia's energy minister says the East-West pipeline is back to 5.8 million barrels a day of capacity; Yanbu stayed within reach of strikes.

  Saudi Arabia's energy minister said on 6 October, at the Made in GCC 2026 forum in Manama, that the East-West pipeline was used again within five or six days of the September attack and that “as of this morning we're back up to 5.8 million barrels” — reported as restored operational capacity of 5.8 million barrels a day (Saudi Gazette; Al Jazeera citing Saudi media; press-reported, no ministry text found). It is a capacity statement, not a measured throughput, loading or export figure. JMIC's Updates 103–105 (8–15 October) relayed the figure, and Update 106 (18 October) says loadings have resumed at Yanbu; Updates 107 to 109 carry no loadings statement. Yanbu stayed within reach of Houthi strikes: JMIC recorded a possible attack striking Yanbu on 1 October with minor disruption to port operations, and Saudi Arabia's defence ministry reported intercepting a ballistic missile aimed at Yanbu on 16 October (as relayed by JMIC). Throughput, loadings and exports stay separate quantities; Yanbu is the shared dependency on which the Strait of Hormuz section's alternative-route reading also rests, and the same barrels are not counted at both gateways.

  Evidence label: Press-reported — Reported in press; not published by the authority.

Outlook

In brief

3.4% of reference traffic (3.5/day over 1–25 October, provisional; 3.6 in September); access via Iranian permits or US-facilitated passage; UKMTO issued 28 warnings classed Attack in the strait from 1 to 30 October, and the IMO's list of confirmed incidents in the strait and the wider Middle East stands at 122 as at 30 October (88 at 30 September).

What changed since the last edition

Direction by dimension (6 applicable) — Methodology §4 · what each measure means

Not applicable here, so not counted: nominal capacity and reservable capacity.

• Effective capacity — stable: PortWatch's mean for 1–25 October, 3.5/day, is within the 5% band of September's 3.6 (−2.8%); 7-day mean below 80% of September's on 4 of 25 days (provisional until the full-month vintage).
• Waiting time — stable: JMIC now publishes queue counts — about 500 vessels waiting outside the strait on 29 Oct, a count first printed on 22 Oct (about 501) — with no earlier value, so no comparable measure moved against the October edition.
• Cost of secured passage — deteriorating (worse): Baltic TD3C VLCC earnings, the price of hiring a tanker to cross the strait, US$1.35M/day (30 Oct), 11% above 17 Sep's US$1.21M; conflict: Maersk's US$1,000/box fee stable; no primary or wire war-risk quote after 24 Sep.
• Allocation rules — stable: PGSA permits, US-facilitated passage, MARAD 2026-011 and OFAC's rule on Iran's fee stand; JMIC's 016-26 (28 Oct) advises neutral ships to have documents ready for review on request: advice, not a condition of passage.
• Access uniformity — deteriorating (worse): The PGSA said on 27 Oct that all Sinokor vessels face 'legal action' from 1 Nov (its X post; party claim) — a measure naming one owner's whole fleet; UKMTO: 59 of 81 strikes on the southern route (was 26 of 43).
• Recovery flexibility — improving (better): Saudi energy minister: 5.8 mb/d of East-West pipeline capacity restored on 6 Oct (JMIC: corroborated by ship-tracking), after September's shutdown; conflict: Khor Fakkan congestion and diversions (Maersk, 26 Oct).

Key figures and evidence

Each figure shows its evidence label; open it for the full text.

• TransitsDerivedAbout 3.5 ship-tracking transits a day over 1–25 October, near September's 3.6 and 3.4% of the June 2023 level (provisional).

  3.5/day for 1–25 October (IMF PortWatch, 25 of 31 days — provisional until the full-month vintage; daily counts 0–8) vs 3.6 for the complete September, 102 at the June-2023 reference and 78.3 in February 2026, the last full month before the crisis — 3.4% of reference and 4.5% of February; on 4 of 25 days the 7-day rolling mean sat below 80% of the September level (2.9 a day; longest run 4 days, 1–4 October). AIS counts are a floor: UKMTO states that US-stated facilitated movements, which it cannot independently verify, outnumbered AIS-observed transits about 3 to 1 in the week to 28 October (VRA Overview Report No. 13, 30 October); the two populations are never summed here, and the other traffic counts on this page are separate populations, never spliced with this line.

  Evidence label: Derived — Computed by WRI from primary figures by a stated method.

• Other traffic counts (context)Primary-publishedUKMTO's and JMIC's counts include US-facilitated movements reported by US NCAGS, which UKMTO says it cannot independently verify; each is its own population, never set against the ship-tracking line.

  UKMTO's VRA Overview Report No. 13 (produced 30 October) counts 122 outbound and 155 inbound transits over the seven days to 28 October (114 and 127 the week before) — UKMTO's own total of AIS-derived transits and US-stated facilitated movements, 'approximately 70% below pre-conflict levels' — with 64 AIS-observed transits (47 the week before); UKMTO says the facilitated figures 'cannot be independently verified by UKMTO at this stage'. JMIC Update 109 (29 October) relays US NCAGS data of 120 US-facilitated transits over 25–28 October and, separately, says US-assisted traffic flows averaged 30 vessel transits a day, against a 2025 historical average of about 138 vessels a day; its count of non-facilitated cargo vessels above 1,000 deadweight tons (S&P Maritime/SeaVision data, vessels calling Iranian ports excluded) shows single-digit daily totals over 22–28 October. The windows and populations differ: these counts are never summed with one another or set beside the PortWatch line. The IMO no longer compiles daily transit data for the strait; its data page shows monthly averages for March to September only.

  Evidence label: Primary-published — The authority's own published figure.

• Estimated commercial flow (context)Third-party estimateKpler estimates confirmed oil flows through the strait at about half their pre-war level (30 October; first prints are read as floors).

  Kpler's media briefing of 30 October (flow data to 28 October; 'Every figure is a confirmed floor and can revise upward at any horizon') puts Total Hormuz Clearance — strait transits plus ship-to-ship net exports in the Gulf of Oman — at a seven-day average of 8,462 thousand barrels a day, about 49% of its pre-war baseline of 17,147 (oil only: crude, products and chemicals; natural gas liquids and LNG excluded). In the same briefing, strait transits alone, Iranian-origin vessels excluded, averaged 7,195 thousand b/d over the seven days, about 42% of that baseline. Kpler's tanker crossings of the strait averaged 11 a day over the seven days to 28 October, against a pre-war level of 50 (Kpler media briefing, 30 October; a separate count, never set beside the ship-tracking line). On 23 October Kpler Insight reported that realised Mideast Gulf loadings averaged 10 million b/d in October to that date, against 9.6 million b/d in September (media briefing, 29 October) — a loadings measure, compared only within that print. The windows and populations differ and are not combined; flow estimates do not change the observed-access reading and are never combined with the PortWatch series.

  Evidence label: Third-party estimate — An attributed external estimate.

• Nominal / reservable capacityPrimary-published

  Not applicable — no design capacity is published for a strait and no booking mechanism exists; Iran's PGSA permit is a case-by-case administrative gate, not a reservable slot.

  Evidence label: Primary-published — The authority's own published figure.

• WaitingPrimary-publishedJMIC now publishes queue counts — about 500 vessels waiting outside the strait on 29 October, a count first printed on 22 October — so they give no comparison with September.

  No formal queue or published waiting time exists. JMIC now publishes anchorage counts from its own AIS tracking, AIS-dark vessels excluded: about 500 vessels were waiting outside the Strait of Hormuz on 29 October (about 492 on 25 October and about 501 on 22 October), 'against single-digit to low double-digit AIS-visible transits per day; thus, the backlog is expected to persist' (Update 109), and, separately, about 181 were at anchor in the vicinity of Fujairah/Khor Fakkan on 29 October, after about 180 on 15 October, a peak of about 217 on 18 October and about 194 on 25 October. These are queue counts, not waiting times; the area counts are not added together or to the waiting total, and both series are new — the anchorage counts from 15 October (Update 105), the count of vessels waiting outside the strait from 22 October (Update 107) — so no September value exists to compare. At the container workaround, Maersk (Middle East operational update 52, 26 October) reports vessel congestion and limited berthing availability at Khor Fakkan, with extended truck waiting times delaying cargo clearance — a carrier-stated constraint at a workaround port, not a waiting time at the strait.

  Evidence label: Primary-published — The authority's own published figure.

• Cost of secured passagePress-reportedThe Baltic Exchange's Gulf–China supertanker assessment stayed above the level the October edition printed, and Maersk's Hormuz fee held at US$1,000 a container.

  Freight: the Baltic Exchange's TD3C assessment (270,000 mt Middle East Gulf–China, round-trip time-charter equivalent for the standard Baltic VLCC) rose from US$1,221,893/day (Worldscale 1,145; report of 2 October) to US$1,412,594/day (WS1,318.75; 9 October), then eased to US$1,370,193/day (WS1,281.25; 16 October) and US$1,287,851/day (WS1,208.13; week-43 report dated 23 October), then rose to US$1,345,710/day (WS1,262.5; week-44 report dated 30 October) — each October assessment above the US$1,212,503/day of 17 September printed in the October edition, the latest about 11% above it (exchange-published, each value dated by its weekly report). Separately, Kpler puts the Mideast Gulf–China VLCC rate at US$35.23 a barrel, with benchmark earnings of about US$1.3 million a day (media briefing, 27 October; third-party estimate) — beside, not in, the TD3C series. Carrier tariff: Maersk's Middle East operational update 52 (26 October) keeps emergency freight of US$1,800 / 3,000 / 3,800 per 20ft / 40ft / reefer, special or DG container and the additional US$1,000 per container for any vessel transiting the Strait of Hormuz, stated to cover insurance premiums and crew-risk compensation — the same rates and fee as update 48 (17 September) — and adds that for Middle East imports the fee 'will be invoiced to the local consignee as basic ocean freight' (carrier-published; a charging rule, not a realised invoice). War-risk cover: no primary or wire quotation later than Reuters of 24 September (6–9% of a vessel's value; press-reported) was found, so no movement is read. The findings conflict; the direction follows the finding read here as binding passage for the marginal unreserved user — the TD3C assessment, the daily price of hiring a tanker to cross the strait — while Maersk's fee, a carrier's charge on cargo, held and war-risk cover shows no newer primary or wire quotation.

  Evidence label: Press-reported — Reported in press; not published by the authority.

• Allocation rulesPrimary-publishedIran's permit system, US-facilitated passage and the US rule on Iran's transit fee stayed in place; on 28 October US naval forces advised neutral ships, via JMIC, to have signed or stamped documents ready for review on request.

  Access runs through Iran's Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA) case-by-case permits (no reservation product) and parallel US-facilitated passage on the southern, Omani-side route, coordinated through US Naval Forces Central Command's Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS). MARAD advisory 2026-011 remains Active on MARAD's page (effective 9 September 2026 to 8 March 2027); MARAD's two advisories of 21 October (2026-014, worldwide; 2026-015, global resources) carry no Hormuz-specific guidance, and MARAD lists no active alerts. OFAC took no action on the Hormuz toll architecture — the PGSA, the Hormuz Safe Marine Services Authority, the fee or its payment rail — between 30 September and 29 October, and its FAQ 1249, under which payments to Iran or the IRGC for safe passage would not be authorised for US persons, still shows 'Updated Date: May 29, 2026'; OFAC's October Iran-related actions, shadow-fleet designations among them, are sanctions on Iranian revenue and shipping, not changes to strait access rules. On 28 October JMIC relayed US Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) guidance on enforcing the blockade (Advisory Note 016-26): neutral vessels 'between neutral ports in the Gulf of Oman and the Strait of Hormuz may be subject to questioning, visit, and search to confirm their intentions regarding the blockade', should be prepared to alter course or stop on direction from US forces, and should have signed or stamped documents ready for review on request — port or customs clearance from the last port of call, the bill of lading if laden, the certificate of registry, a letter of appointment from the agent at the next port of call, receipts or signed contracts for provisions, bunkers, spare parts, repairs or crew change there, and a terminal, port or berth booking confirmation; vessels that do not need to transit are advised to remain well clear, and those that do to plan additional transit time. JMIC's note of 14 July on the blockade (015-26) already set out the right of visit and search and advised masters to consider compliance with the blockading forces' directions, but gave no document list for neutral transits. The new elements are advice: vessels should 'have the following documents ready for review on request, as applicable' — the note's one 'must' governs their form ('signed/ stamped and in PDF format') — and are 'advised to plan additional transit time'; neither sets a condition for passage, so the reading is stable. JMIC's statement that vessels transiting with AIS on can expect to 'receive directed hails instructing them to divert toward the northern Iranian-controlled route' (Update 109) repeats its wording of 27 September (Update 100). Enforcement and facilitation series, each in its own population and never merged: CENTCOM, a party to the conflict, says its forces redirected 13 more commercial vessels under its blockade of Iranian ports between 30 September and 17 October (its own count, read as an increment, never a rate); JMIC relays US NCAGS data of US-assisted traffic flows averaging 30 vessel transits a day (Update 109). The IRGC Navy's October declarations — on 9 October that enforcement against vessels on what it calls unauthorized passages 'would no longer be confined to the Strait of Hormuz', and on 17 October that the strait 'is closed' — are party claims, recorded in the outlook; the PGSA's statement of 27 October on Sinokor vessels is read under Access uniformity; the month's attacks are recorded as security events.

  Evidence label: Primary-published — The authority's own published figure.

• Access uniformityPress-reportedIran's permit body said all ships of one South Korean owner would face 'legal action' from 1 November (a party statement on its X account), a measure naming an owner's whole fleet, and strikes kept concentrating on the US-facilitated southern route.

  Identity-conditional (both): access varies by flag, affiliation, ownership and destination — Iran-linked and PGSA-permitted vessels advantaged on the northern, Iranian-side route; US/allied-linked tonnage and vessels without crisis-priced cover disadvantaged. The PGSA, a party instrument, said on 20 October that 122 vessels had been added to its Non-Compliance List (its own X account). WRI could not read the PGSA's page on 27 or 30 October because a security check blocks automated access, so no count from the page itself is current. On 27 October the PGSA said that all vessels related to the South Korean owner Sinokor would face 'legal action' from 1 November (its own X post; party claim, not verified) — a measure that names one owner's whole fleet, where the list names vessels. Bloomberg calculated that Sinokor-owned ships carried almost 40% of the oil crossing the strait in September (press-reported; Bloomberg calculation on Vortexa, Equasis and Signal Group data). The incident pattern is consistent with differentiation, the weakest evidence class: UKMTO's VRA Overview Report No. 13 counts 59 of the 81 projectile strikes since 6 July on the southern route (Report No. 8, cited in October: 26 of 43), and on 5 October UKMTO recorded an inbound tanker 11 nautical miles north of Khasab 'hailed by the IRGC and instructed to turn back or the vessel would be targeted', whose master complied (Advisory 152-26). Destination also conditions access: Argus reported on 6 October that Iran has permitted some LNG transits for delivery to Pakistan, linked to Pakistan's role in hosting US–Iran talks (press-reported, an unattributed statement), and the LNG carrier Al Mafyar crossed the strait that day, bound for Port Qasim (LSEG tracking via Reuters, 8 October); no delivery has been recorded. Gatekeepers: PGSA, IRGC Navy, NAVCENT, OFAC, war-risk underwriters.

  Evidence label: Press-reported — Reported in press; not published by the authority.

• Recovery flexibilityPress-reportedSaudi Arabia said capacity on its East-West pipeline, a crude route around the strait, was restored; LNG has no route around the strait, and the container workaround is congested.

  No booking system exists, so recovery means rerouting or a workaround, read cargo class by cargo class. Crude: Saudi Arabia's energy minister said on 6 October that the kingdom had restored 5.8 million barrels a day of operational capacity on the East-West pipeline to Yanbu (Saudi Gazette; the minister's statement as carried by the press), which JMIC relays as 'confirmed by Saudi Arabia's minister of energy on Oct. 6 and corroborated by ship-tracking data' (Update 105, as posted with a draft watermark) — against the shutdown of 10–22 September and the reduced restart the October edition recorded; capacity is not throughput. JMIC Update 102 (4 October) records Yanbu loadings resumed from about 27–29 September, 'running well below the pre-attack rate', and Kpler puts weekly Yanbu exports at about 3 million b/d on average since the pipeline's restart, topping 4 million b/d in the week of 12 October (media briefing, 27 October; third-party estimate); Kpler Insight reported on 29 October that actualised Saudi West Coast loadings were near 2.6 million b/d in October to date, about 400 thousand b/d lower than in September (media briefing, 30 October; third-party estimate); pipeline capacity, terminal loadings and exports are different quantities and are not combined. Kpler also puts loadings at the Fujairah and Oman terminals outside the strait at a seven-day average of 4,634 thousand b/d to 28 October, about 36% above their pre-war baseline of 3,417 (media briefing, 30 October; third-party estimate). The bypass stays exposed: Saudi forces intercepted a ballistic missile aimed at Yanbu on 16 October (Saudi Ministry of Defence, via JMIC Update 106), and Greece's Patriot air-defence battery, in Saudi Arabia since 2021, 'protects critical energy infrastructure in Yanbu'; on 25 October Greece told Saudi Arabia it 'responds positively' to the request that the battery remain (Greek Prime Minister's Office) — protection of the terminal is not a measure of its loadings. LNG: the pipeline carries crude only, and Gulf LNG still crosses the strait; Qatari LNG deliveries were reported in October, among them Al Sadd at Dahej, India, on 3 October (Kpler and LSEG tracking via Reuters, as carried by Ajel) and Al Areesh at Engro's terminal in Pakistan on 13 October (The News via Geo TV, citing a Petroleum Division official) — single completions that do not establish dependable access. QatarEnergy's chief executive told Reuters on 29 October that the company had studied and ruled out pipeline options (press-reported). Containers: Maersk's update 52 (26 October) reports congestion at Khor Fakkan, is moving the final destination of selected Khor Fakkan shipments to Jebel Ali, and lists landside bookings paused on several corridors, among them cargo from Salalah and Sohar to the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar. The findings conflict; the direction follows the finding that binds passage for the marginal unreserved user, read here as the crude bypass — the one route around the strait that was lost in September, whose capacity is now stated to be restored — while the container workaround still operates, congested and with some landside corridors paused, Maersk's priced Hormuz-transit service is still offered, and Gulf LNG has no route around the strait in either edition.

  Evidence label: Press-reported — Reported in press; not published by the authority.

• Security incidents (record)Primary-publishedThe IMO's list of confirmed incidents stands at 122 as at 30 October, against 88 at 30 September; UKMTO issued 28 warnings classed Attack in the strait from 1 to 30 October.

  The IMO's list of confirmed incidents in the Strait of Hormuz and the Middle East stands at 122 as at 30 October 2026, with 24 confirmed seafarer fatalities (IMO; 88 and 24 as at 30 September, printed in October). Its October entries include GFS PRIDE (13 October, 'Sunk. No pollution.'), PETRO DOLPHIN (11 October, Sohar anchorage, 'Two seafarers missing.') and ON PEACE (5 October, 'Twelve seafarers injured.'); the newest, both of 23 October, are GHANA PROSPERITY (Strait of Hormuz, 'Damaged. No pollution.') and LEONORA KOSAN (6 nautical miles north-east of Limah, Oman, 'Damaged. No pollution.'). The list is not a count of Iranian attacks: it includes a 10 October entry for AKIRA SUN (OCEAN MOLICA), the vessel CENTCOM says US forces disabled. UKMTO's numbered products placed in the strait ran from 147-26 (1 October) to 189-26 (issued 30 October): 28 warnings classed Attack (185-26 and 187-26 were issued as Suspicious Activity and classed Attack in their updates) and one Suspicious Activity advisory (152-26) — reports, several of them time-late, not necessarily separate attacks. The latest, 189-26 (issued 30 October), is a time-late report that a crude oil tanker 'was struck by an unknown projectile whilst completing an outbound transit' (incident date 28 October, time 'TBC'); those of 29 October are 185-26, a dhow 9 nautical miles north of Khasab that regional authorities say was 'involved in a maritime security incident' that set her on fire and sank her, her crew safely evacuated (03:00 UTC); 186-26, a tanker 'struck by an unknown projectile whilst completing an outbound transit' (16:00 UTC), with no reported injuries; and 187-26, an outbound tanker 25 nautical miles north-east of Khasab to whose hull a small boat 'attached two explosive devices', the blasts starting an engine-room fire that temporarily disabled her before she continued to her next port of call, her crew safe (22:12 UTC). UKMTO's VRA Overview Report No. 13 (produced 30 October; reporting range 28 February–28 October) counts 145 Iran–US conflict-related incidents in the Strait of Hormuz, Arabian Gulf and Gulf of Oman (144 'total events reported' on its incidents page): 122 reports of damage to vessels, 13 near-miss reports and, as outcomes, 7 total losses, 26 requiring assistance and 113 continuing their voyage (as printed; these sum to 146); its 'injury / fatalities' tile of 77 is a combined figure, not a fatality count (Report No. 8, printed in October: 106 events). JMIC counts 160 confirmed vessel incidents across its Middle East maritime region since 1 March (Update 109, 29 October; 119 at Update 100, 27 September) and holds the strait at SEVERE. Dispositions: the Cape Dao, struck on 23 September, was reported sunk by 22 October (IMO list), confirmed by NAVAREA IX 403/26 on 24 October, about 35 nautical miles east of Sohar; no authority gives the date she sank — NAVAREA IX 380/26 reported her sinking and drifting on 16 October, and JMIC, which said on 18 October that she had not sunk, records her in Update 109 (29 October) as reported sunk, citing 403/26, since cancelled. The container ship GFS PRIDE, struck on 13 October, sank on 14 October (JMIC Update 105, as posted with a draft watermark; NAVAREA IX 373/26, 14 October). JMIC relays UAE authorities' confirmation on 23 October of oil pollution on the Umm Al Quwain coastline from a tanker damaged in an earlier attack (Update 108). A separate count, in the Washington Institute's words and not WRI's: 28 confirmed and reported attacks in October to the 23rd, 113 since 28 February, the highest monthly count in its Middle East map (Noam Raydan, quoted by Reuters, 23 October). Each holder's count keeps its own population and date; none is summed, averaged, ranked or matched to another's numbers.

  Evidence label: Primary-published — The authority's own published figure.

Outlook

Completed passages and milestones

Per-gateway ledger — Methodology Annex C

Completed passages whose completion is stated by an authority record, a corroborated arrival or reporting of the delivery are labelled single completions; a passage read from tracker logs alone sits at observed; milestones follow the ladder announced → scheduled → observed → verified. Date is the event date; Checked is the date WRI checked the entry against its cited source (verified_date in the CSV). Full ledger: milestone ledger (CSV) · provenance.

Revisions between vintages

High-frequency source revisions — Methodology Annex B

Kpler's count of tanker crossings of the Strait of Hormuz, the high-frequency series this edition cites, is printed in Kpler's weekday media briefings as four daily values and a seven-day average: the published table carries 108 daily prints from 27 briefings (vintages 24 September to 30 October) over 40 observation-days (19 September to 28 October). 38 of those days were printed at more than one vintage and 35 of them were revised, all upward; of the 68 later prints, 55 revised the count upward, 13 left it stable and none revised it downward. The largest revision was the count for 7 October, 5 to 18 between the 9 October and 12 October briefings. The seven-day average is printed once per briefing, for its latest day (27 prints, none reprinted); built partly on first prints, it is read as a floor in the same way. First prints on this series are read as floors until a later briefing confirms them. IMF PortWatch's day-level series was compared between the full-September vintage of 6 October and this edition's vintage: of the 455 observation-days in both (seven gateways, 1 August–4 October), none was revised.

Observation date and vintage date are recorded separately and never compared across vintages; first prints on these series are floors until a later vintage confirms them. Full observation-by-vintage table: vintage log (CSV) · provenance.

Transparency scorecard

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