Gateway Access Monitor

Outlook — hydrological. NOAA CPC assigns a greater-than-90% probability of a very strong El Niño persisting into 2027; the ACP reports watershed rainfall 34% below and inflows 44% below historical averages, and frames A-29's slot and draft steps as water-conservation measures. Directionally: further slot and draft reductions remain more likely than relief.

Update — 15 September. The ACP’s August operations summary (A-34, posted 10 September, after this edition’s release) is now available: average Canal Waters Time rose to 34.90 hours (monthly high 69.41) from July’s 25.38 — a 37.5% increase; the edition’s waiting-time direction, stable on the information available at its cut, is unchanged, and the August figures inform the October reassessment — with in-transit time at 11.27 hours and oceangoing transits averaging 33.19/day. The same advisory publishes booking-slot utilisation by class (Neopanamax 98.3% of offered slots used in August; auctioned slots 89.9%) and schedules an 11-day Panamax culvert outage for 22 September–3 October. Booking dates from 15 September run under the reduced 32-slot offer (A-29), and the revised Neopanamax allocation rules (A-31) apply to booking dates from 13 September — overlapping changes whose effects this page separates before attributing either. Full incorporation at the October edition.

Update — 20 September. ACP Advisory A-35-2026 (16 September, effective immediately) clarifies that the consecutive-booking-date restriction in the Panamax locks applies only within a single booking period — consecutive transit dates drawn from different booking periods are permitted, subject to availability and the other reservation requirements. A loosening interpretation on day two of the 32-slot regime; slot totals and the other A-28 rules are unchanged. The tentative eleven-day Panamax culvert outage (22 September – 3 October) begins within the current booking regime; the maintenance schedule lists estimated Panamax capacity of 23 during the window — within, not additional to, the 15 September slot reduction. Booking utilisation, premiums, waiting and completed transits through the window feed the October edition. Direction calls change only at the October edition.

Update — 23 September. One business day into the tentative culvert-maintenance window (22 September – 3 October), no advisory confirms or postpones commencement; the governing document remains A-11-2026 and the window is recorded as unconfirmed rather than in force. Booking utilisation, premiums, waiting and completed transits continue to be observed through the window for the October edition. Direction calls change only at the October edition.

Outlook — none announced. Recovery evidence strengthened but the persistence test — completed at this edition's release refresh, with the daily series now running to 6 September — is not passed: Lloyd's List Intelligence tracked a second consecutive elevated week (290 transits 24–30 August, ~30% above 2025, still ~36% below normal on its own AIS weekly series), Drewry reported carriers adding Suez transits, and containership transits reached 196 in August (+36% year on year yet ~65% below August 2023; MDS Transmodal) — but on the daily PortWatch series (five ship types) this edition reads, the 7-day rolling mean held at or above the July mean for at most seven consecutive days (21–27 August) against the fourteen the methodology requires, so no recovery classification is made. The returning traffic is segment-specific: Lloyd's List Intelligence records year-on-year gains across bulk, container, tanker and vehicle-carrier segments, with northbound Saudi crude rerouted from Hormuz an additional boost. Security pressure shifted rather than cleared: Houthi strikes on 8 September hit Jazan-area Saudi energy facilities — the first strike wave on Saudi territory since 9 August and the largest of the conflict (73 injured per the Saudi-led coalition) — with further missile and drone strikes on Khamis Mushait, Abha and Jazan on 9 September per the coalition, and no attack on Red Sea shipping reported since 24 August. Announced cost measure: MSC's Piracy Risk Surcharge (US$55/TEU) and Suez Canal Surcharge (US$36/TEU) apply from 15 September by proforma date on Asia–East Mediterranean/Black Sea trades (carrier advisory; announced, not yet in force at the cut). No SCA forward-dated capacity changes at the data cut; carrier returns remain the swing variable and are decided outside the canal authority. Monitorable, not forecastable.

Update — 11 September. Houthi forces captured the Red Sea port city of Mocha at dawn on 10 September and were reported advancing toward the Hanish Islands (Yemeni government military sources via Reuters; the capture is acknowledged by both belligerents and was cited by the UN envoy at the Security Council; the islands’ status is unresolved and rests on one side’s sourcing). Preliminary same-day ship-tracking showed Bab el-Mandeb crossings falling sharply on 10 September — six by mid-afternoon UAE time against about thirty a day earlier, with almost no inbound movement (Kpler preliminary intraday counts via press; partial-day, revisable, never comparable with this page’s series) — while the Joint Maritime Information Center’s Update 095 (published 10 September) records 112 transits over 6–9 September, all before the capture. Brent rose above US$105. No closure of the strait is reported, no UKMTO or JMIC product had been issued after the capture by this update’s cut, and no post-capture war-risk quotation was available. This update records the event and its attributed terms; direction calls change only at the October edition.

Update — 12 September. Houthi forces reached Perim (Mayun) island inside the Bab el-Mandeb strait on 11 September, and took the mainland coastal town of Dhubab facing it, with two of four Yemeni government sources telling Reuters that government forces had withdrawn from the island (single-side sourcing on the island’s status; no closure of the strait is reported). Saudi Arabia separately shut the East-West pipeline — the overland Hormuz bypass feeding Red Sea loadings at Yanbu — as a stated precautionary measure after drone strikes on pumping stations in the Riyadh and Medina regions on 10 September (Saudi energy ministry via wires; drones attributed by both governments to launches from Iraq; no restart date or export-loss figure published). A pipeline interruption sits upstream of the Yanbu export choice between northbound Suez and southbound Bab el-Mandeb sailings: the sea route and its overland alternative degraded in the same week. Full-day ship-tracking for 10 September — the capture day — showed 26 Bab el-Mandeb transits against a 10-day average near 27 (Kpler via Reuters, preliminary and revisable): the sharp intraday fall recorded in the 11 September update did not persist across the full day. Brent traded above US$107. No UKMTO or JMIC product addressing the island had been issued by this update’s cut. This update records events and attributed terms; direction calls change only at the October edition.

Update — 15 September. The territorial picture consolidated: AP reporting, sourced to both government and Houthi officials, records Perim (Mayun) held and Greater and Lesser Hanish — about 160 km north of the strait — captured, superseding the single-side sourcing and unresolved island status recorded in the updates above. Traffic recovered to its depressed average after a one-day fall: 15 Bab el-Mandeb transits on 11 September (the day Perim was reached), then 24 on Saturday and 27 on Sunday against a 10-day average near 27 (Kpler via Reuters; preliminary and revisable — first prints on this series have so far revised upward) — the level recovered while the security regime beneath it changed. Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline repair is estimated at three to five weeks by two regional officials briefed on the damage (AP; partial operation possible, throughput unquantified), against attributed trader estimates of five to seven days of export cover from Yanbu stocks (Reuters) — the overland alternative degrades on a longer clock than the buffer behind it. MSC’s Piracy Risk (US$55/TEU) and Suez Canal (US$36/TEU) surcharges entered application on 15 September by proforma date (carrier advisory; a charging rule, not yet a measured realised cost). Directions change only at the October edition.

Update — 16 September. The bypass terminal itself has now halted: oil loadings at Yanbu are suspended and Saudi Arabia has told European customers that some September-loading crude cargoes will be cancelled (Reuters, trade sources) — a halt arriving on roughly day five of the pipeline shutdown, consistent with the attributed five-to-seven-day stock-cover estimate recorded above. Bab el-Mandeb transits printed 21 on Monday 15 September’s vintage for the 14th, after Sunday’s figure was revised from 27 to 28 in the later print — the upward first-print revision this page’s own caveat anticipates. Dated Brent traded near US$122 a barrel against futures near US$108 — the physical premium is the clearest current price of secured passage. Direction calls change only at the October edition.

Update — 20 September. Later assessments extend the East-West pipeline repair picture recorded on 15 September: Reuters reports satellite analysis and industry sources indicating three damaged pumping stations, with full-capacity repair estimated at five to six weeks, while attributed reports describe a bypass targeting roughly half of pre-attack throughput on a faster horizon (Kpler places even odds on partial recovery of 2–2.5 million barrels per day of exports within about a month). On 19 September the Saudi-led coalition said it intercepted a ballistic missile over Riyadh and thwarted attempted attacks including on Yanbu; the Houthi military spokesman claimed strikes on Aramco facilities there without providing evidence; no damage at Yanbu has been independently established, and the loading suspension recorded on 16 September stands. Italy activated national-command naval escorts for Italian-flag and Italian-owned vessels through Bab el-Mandeb (announced 17 September), declining to wait for EU Aspides transit decisions while remaining within the operation’s architecture; with India’s national tanker escorts and the US facilitation programme in the Strait of Hormuz, naval protection is increasingly organised by flag. The US JMIC advisory of 13 September formally lists Mokha, Dhubab, Perim and the Hanish Islands as Houthi-held — primary-class corroboration of the both-sides record noted on 15 September. Kpler counts printed 21 on Wednesday 16 September and 23 on Thursday 17 September against a 10-day average near 26 (preliminary; Tuesday was revised from 22 to 24). The four-service Gemini return to Suez began on schedule: AIS records Antonia Maersk departing Tanjung Pelepas on 19 September (08:40 UTC), currently at anchor in the Singapore Strait with the westbound ocean leg not yet observed; Marchen Maersk is scheduled for 21 September and Cornelia Maersk from Colombo for 24 September (the carriers’ notices differ on that one date; vessel movements support the 24th), with first eastbound sailings from 22 September and one service pair still unscheduled — both carriers condition the moves on continued Red Sea stability. Drewry’s World Container Index (17 September) rose 1% to USD 4,500 per 40ft while Asia–Europe spot rates fell — Shanghai–Rotterdam down 9% — with Drewry attributing the decline partly to the gradual return of services through Suez and naming renewed Red Sea security risk as the main threat to the restoration pace. Separately, UKMTO recorded a skiff pursuing a westbound tanker 75NM east of Aden (17 September, classified as suspicious activity); an AFP analysis of IMO data (27 August) counts at least fifteen attacks this year in the wider Gulf of Aden–Somalia region, the highest since 2013 — a distinct piracy strand, not part of this gateway’s security regime. Direction calls change only at the October edition.

Update — 23 September. Reuters (22 September, three sources briefed on the matter) reports the East-West pipeline restarted at a low pumping rate, with damage at three of the line’s eleven pumping stations and Aramco seeking to return the rate to the 4 million barrel-per-day reroute level (nameplate capacity 7 million). Full-restoration timing is uncertain and level-unspecified in the sourcing: a security source estimated roughly 40% of capacity within days and a full restart in six to eight weeks, while a separate industry source put a return to full pumping rates at up to six weeks. One China-bound cargo was scheduled to load at Yanbu that day. Bloomberg’s independent reporting the same day describes the system as in the early stages of start-up, running tests, and targeting meaningful flows by 26 September. A reported restart is recorded here as a claim: no loading has been observed — visible Yanbu loadings remain at zero since 16 September — and the suspension recorded on 16 September stands until one is. The US Maritime Administration’s Red Sea / Bab el-Mandeb advisory (2026-006) passed its 22 September expiry with no successor posted and its listing unchanged — a lapse in this advisory line; this page re-checks daily and will record a successor or a formal cancellation when either appears. The Suez Canal Authority confirms the container ship OOCL Portugal (24,000-TEU class) transited the canal southbound on 16 September on a Belgium–China voyage — described by the Authority as the first southbound transit for a COSCO-controlled line since the tensions; tracker data corroborate the canal passage, while her subsequent Bab el-Mandeb passage is not yet observed and remains open. The same release reports container-ship net tonnage through the canal up 54.2% January–August year on year. All four first-wave Gemini vessels now declare Suez routings: Cornelia Maersk departed Colombo on 22 September — two days ahead of the published schedule — with a declared Suez arrival of 30 September; Maastricht Maersk departed Algeciras on 22 September via Tanger Med (declared Suez arrival 27 September); Antonia and Marchen Maersk continue westbound with declared arrivals of 2 October. Declarations are not passages, and each is recorded as such. Bab el-Mandeb crossings printed 26 on both Sunday and Monday (preliminary). Direction calls change only at the October edition.

Update — 24 September. The advisory lapse recorded on 23 September is closed: the US Maritime Administration issued Advisory 2026-013 (Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb, Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea and Somali Basin) effective 23 September, expiring 22 March 2027, stating that it “supersedes and cancels U.S. Maritime Advisory 2026-006” — a successor issued one day after the predecessor’s expiry. The new advisory carries the first placement in a US authority document of the reported 24 August Houthi missile strikes on the tankers Amzan and Daisy off Yanbu, and guidance for US-flagged vessels on AIS operation. Visible Yanbu loadings remained at zero at this page’s 24 September re-check; the reported pipeline restart recorded on 23 September stands as a claim. Direction calls change only at the October edition.

Outlook — none. Escalation continued past the cut: CENTCOM stated US forces struck five further Iranian-linked tankers on 8 September after missile fire toward another US warship (eight tankers in four days; CENTCOM-attributed outcomes), and Iran's Supreme National Security Council announced a forthcoming exclusion zone outside the strait — a plan with no published boundaries or enforcement terms, though the IRGC on 9 September claimed to have fired on two US vessels and eight tankers “attempting to cross an area of the Strait of Hormuz that it has declared off-limits” and threatened tankers in Kuwaiti and Bahraini ports (Iranian state statements via Reuters; claims, not verified outcomes) — recorded here as announced risk, not an observed rule change. The exchanges broadened on 9 September: UKMTO issued two attack warnings — a tanker struck by an unknown projectile 28 nautical miles south-east of Al-Faw, and a vessel listing at anchor 24 nautical miles north-west of Port Rashid after a reported strike — and an advisory that several merchant vessels in the Northern Arabian Gulf and Gulf of Oman had been subject to disabling fire amid ongoing military activity (UKMTO Warnings 130/131-26, Advisory 129-26); Reuters described the wave as the largest attack on shipping since the conflict began. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines' CEO said resumption in any form is difficult to see by year-end (Bloomberg, 3 September), and Rystad expects flows to stay very low until November. The freight market prices the workaround: the Baltic Exchange's Gulf of Oman–China VLCC assessment — the crisis-era route created in March for loadings outside the strait — printed a round-voyage time-charter equivalent above US$261,800/day at its 3 September weekly report, with Lloyd's List reporting the 8 September daily assessment at US$358,201/day, up 144% month on month and the highest since the route began (press-reported; Baltic assessments are earnings-equivalents, not fixtures), while Vortexa counts around 40 VLCCs waiting east of Hormuz by late August, the most since the start of 2025, as tonnage is absorbed by the shuttle and ship-to-ship system. A first probe the other way: QatarEnergy's Al Marrouna is transiting with AIS on — the first LNG carrier to do so in about six weeks — bound for Port Qasim, due 10 September (ship-tracking via press). With the June memorandum of understanding lapsed and no new framework announced, the strait remains under discretionary permitting and elevated kinetic risk; the Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC) expects traffic to remain at reduced levels. Security incidents continued through the data cut — United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) Warning 122-26 (tanker struck 29 Aug), US strikes on Larak Island launchers (30 Aug; press-reported), Advisory 123-26 (31 Aug), and Warning 124-26 — two laden VLCCs (Sidr; Senegal Prosperity) struck by projectiles minutes apart late on 31 Aug while transiting outbound — UKMTO's 2 Sep update (Warning 126-26) confirmed two crew fatalities aboard the Sidr, after initial reports of no casualties (vessel and cargo identifications press-reported). Day-to-day movement remains unstable (31 of 31 August days below the July level); whether any improvement is sustained is read against the 14-day persistence rule from this edition onward.

Update — 12 September. Commodity-vessel transits stayed in single digits — seven on 10 September against a 10-day average of fifteen, five entering and two exiting (Kpler via Reuters, preliminary); the same vintage revised 9 September upward from seven to eleven, the third consecutive daily observation revised upward, so first-print counts on this series are floors that firm over several days. One completed passage is recorded on the positive side: the QatarEnergy carrier Al Marrouna exited the strait and delivered a Ras Laffan cargo to Pakistan on 10 September — the first known Qatar-linked LNG shipment since late July (Reuters); a single completion does not establish dependable access. The drone strikes that shut Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline on 10 September (see the Suez / Red Sea update) removed, for the duration of the shutdown, the principal overland alternative to this strait. Direction calls change only at the October edition.

Update — 15 September. Strikes on vessels continued: UKMTO Warning 134-26 records a vessel struck by an unknown projectile while transiting the strait at 23:00 UTC on 12 September; Iranian state media report an Iranian container vessel hit near Hengam Island the same night — one crew member dead, four injured, with fire and crew evacuation (timing consistent with the UKMTO report; identity matching is press-based). The Financial Times reports, from US naval coordination centre emails to maritime advisers, that US air-defence protection for tankers narrowed to two daily time slots around the start of September after night attacks increased — an allocation constraint on the escorted corridor, and recent strikes cluster at night. Weekend traffic held in single digits on both days against a 10-day average of 14, with four vessels exiting and ten entering (Kpler via Reuters, preliminary). The Iran–Gulf meeting on the strait scheduled for 14 September in Salalah was postponed (Omani foreign ministry; press reports attribute the postponement to participation questions rather than any single incident). Direction calls change only at the October edition.

Update — 16 September. UKMTO Warning 135-26 (report dated 14 September, issued 15 September) records another vessel struck by an unknown projectile while transiting the strait — no damage reported, the first such no-damage strike in the recent sequence (133-26 → 134-26 → 135-26). Visible transits printed four on Monday 14 September — the lowest daily count in this series to date (first print; preliminary and revisable). Traffic displaced from the Red Sea bypass is moving through this strait instead: with Yanbu loadings suspended, Reuters reports Gulf producers sustaining 7–9 million barrels per day — 30–40% of pre-war volumes — via so-called dark shipments, and Vortexa records Saudi Gulf-side loadings at Ras Tanura/Juaymah of 22 million barrels across 12 vessels in the week of 7–13 September against 6–7 vessels weekly in the prior three weeks. Direction calls change only at the October edition.

Update — 20 September. UKMTO’s incident listing has added three further Attack entries since the 16 September note: Warning 137-26 (17 September, 16NM northeast of Khasab — crew safe), and two 18 September entries not yet carrying public designation numbers — a tanker struck with an onboard fire since extinguished, and a time-late report of a 16 September strike on an outbound tanker (all crews reported safe). The strike sequence since 10 September now runs 133-26 → 134-26 → 135-26 → 137-26 plus the two unnumbered entries. Separately, the IRGC Navy publicly claimed striking the Togo-flagged product tanker Trend for attempting a transit outside Iran’s approved-passage system (statement of 17 September via Iranian state media, which also instructed shipping to disregard US naval guidance); AP could not confirm the report and no UKMTO product names the vessel — an attributed, uncorroborated claim whose significance is its enforcement framing. Iran’s press-reported vessel blacklist has grown from 56 to 57 (Riviera Maritime, via press). The US JMIC advisory of 13 September recorded about 70 US-facilitated transits over 10–12 September and defines its counting populations — facilitated movements versus visible cargo vessels over 1,000 dwt — a third counting basis beside the Kpler and PortWatch series; none are spliced. Kpler daily counts continued to revise upward: Monday 14 September’s first print of four was revised to seven, Tuesday’s four to twelve, and Wednesday’s three to six — fifteen of sixteen observation-days have now revised upward, and no daily count below four has survived seasoning; Thursday 17 September printed four (first print, preliminary) against a 10-day average near sixteen. On cost: Maersk’s operational update 48 (17 September) published the first carrier tariff schedule for secured Gulf passage — emergency freight of USD 1,800 / 3,000 / 3,800 per 20ft / 40ft / reefer container across Gulf destinations, plus USD 1,000 per container for any Hormuz transit, stated to cover insurance premiums and crew-risk compensation and replacing the prior landbridge charges. Press-reported VLCC spot assessments have moved above USD 500,000/day (from about USD 132,000 before the war — Allied Shipbroking via Reuters, a broker estimate), and Kpler estimates a freight premium of roughly USD 10 per barrel for loading inside the Gulf versus the Gulf of Oman, with Fujairah and Sohar transfer capacity described as at or near its limit. Reuters (18 September, trade sources) reports about 60 million barrels sold for September–October loading from Ras Tanura via ship-to-ship transfer at Sohar — roughly 1–1.5 million barrels per day, similar to or slightly higher than August; the Petroleum Association of Japan states on the record that in some cases oil crosses the strait at Saudi risk before transfer outside the Gulf. Sales are not deliveries, and the first leg still crosses this strait. Direction calls change only at the October edition.

Update — 21 September. Scope note on the 16 September entry’s dark-shipment figure, following an internal review flag: Reuters’ wire of 15–16 September attaches 30–40% of pre-war volumes to the 7–9 million barrels per day it reports Gulf producers exporting via so-called dark shipments — the agency’s own wording, relayed here unchanged. Reuters’ separate data analysis of 9 September carries a broader accounting: Goldman Sachs putting total Gulf exports, including dark crossings, at 15–16 million barrels per day — roughly two-thirds of pre-war — with a 35% figure applying to refined products only, and Vortexa’s seven-day strait average near 8 million. The two items measure different populations — dark-enabled export volumes against total Gulf flows — and are not spliced here; the 16 September sentence stands as published, with this note recording the distinction. Direction calls change only at the October edition.

Update — 23 September. UKMTO added two attack warnings on 21 September: 140-26 — an inbound tanker struck by an unknown projectile, two crew members with minor injuries, continuing under her own power — and 141-26, an outbound LPG carrier hit by debris from unknown projectiles, crew safe (a Master-sourced, time-late report). Press reporting (Marisks, a Greek maritime-risk firm, via Reuters) identifies the vessels as the crude tanker LR Stephanie (struck 21 September, entering) and the LPG carrier Al Maryah (incident 20 September); the names are not carried by UKMTO’s own products, and report dates and incident dates are recorded separately. That makes five attack-classified strait incidents by incident date over 16–21 September (139-26; 137-26 — the Trend, whose identity the coalition’s JMIC has since corroborated; 138-26 — the STI Steadfast; 140-26; 141-26). No actor has claimed the strikes; attribution framing rests with JMIC, not UKMTO. Visible transits printed two on Monday 21 September — both inbound bulk carriers, with no outbound movement visible (first print, preliminary; the same reporting shows LR Stephanie entering that day, so the visible count is a floor, not an exhaustive record). Sunday 20 September’s count has now been revised 6 → 7 → 10 across three successive vintages. Tanker tracking put Sunday’s Gulf-terminal loadings at 12–14 million barrels across six to seven supertankers (TankerTrackers.com via Reuters, satellite-corroborated; MarineTraffic counts the lower figure — the range is retained rather than either point). Loadings, strait transits and ship-to-ship volumes overlap — the same barrels can appear in each series, and they are never summed here. Kpler’s own analysis puts Gulf-of-Oman ship-to-ship volumes at a record 7.2 million barrels per day so far in September (0.16 million before the war), with Kpler’s caveat that repeated transfers double-count against strait transits. Direction calls change only at the October edition.

Update — 24 September. UKMTO Warning 142-26 (report time 06:30 UTC, 23 September) records an attack in the strait off the Musandam peninsula: a cargo vessel struck by an unknown projectile, on fire and adrift, all crew evacuated with — in UKMTO’s own wording — “2 casualties reported”. Oman’s Maritime Security Centre identifies the vessel as the bulk carrier Cape Dao (Antigua and Barbuda flag) and states the Royal Navy of Oman evacuated 27 crew, with an engine-room fire, about 2.5 nautical miles off Musandam Governorate; UKMTO’s warning does not name the vessel. The Embassy of India in Muscat confirms the loss of one Indian national among 19 Indian crew aboard — the first fatality among the attack-classified strait incidents in the sequence this page tracks (133-26 onward). Crew figures differ across holders — 19 Indian nationals (embassy), 27 evacuated (Oman MSC), “all crew … 2 casualties” (UKMTO) — and are recorded per holder rather than reconciled. No actor has claimed the strike. The vessel’s status is open: the last authoritative state is on fire and adrift, with no towage or salvage confirmation as of 24 September; this page re-checks daily. The IMO’s count now stands at 84 confirmed incidents and 23 confirmed seafarer fatalities as at 23 September — its listed entries run through 21 September and do not yet include the Cape Dao, so the two records are not summed here. Separately, on the outlook strand only: the United States and Iran completed a round of indirect, mediated talks in New York on 22 September (Special Envoy Witkoff and Jared Kushner on the US side, Foreign Minister Araghchi for Iran; Iranian officials state the sides did not meet face-to-face, with mediators shuttling between them), with reopening of this strait on the agenda and Iran’s conditions and seven-day reopening timeline restated. Both principals characterised the round positively on the record; the same day, President Trump’s UN address coupled openness to an agreement with a threat to “annihilate” Iran absent one, placing an expected agreement after the November midterms. A completed round is a stage change from the offer-and-rebuff position recorded on 23 September; it changes no reading. Direction calls change only at the October edition.