← Logistics Growth Index (LGI)

Data as of .

Pre-methodology edition — produced before the Monitor’s methodology v1.0; later editions differ in references and evidence labelling, as the methodology states.

This month at a glance

The counts show direction, not severity, and follow launch-edition conventions, so they are not comparable with later editions. They are not a score or a ranking and are not comparable between chokepoints; measures that do not apply at a chokepoint are left out of its count.

Released 23 August 2026, 17:07 UTC. The September 2026 edition publishes on 10 September 2026, 09:00 UTC. Corrected 5 times, last on 6 September 2026 · last updated 10 September 2026 · Corrections log

How to read this page

This launch edition pre-dates the Monitor’s methodology: its references, direction counts and evidence labelling follow launch-edition conventions.

The Gateway Access Monitor assesses, each month, how reliably commercial users can secure passage through seven of the world’s principal maritime chokepoints. Three — the Panama Canal, the Suez Canal / Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz — receive a full assessment across eight measures of access; all seven appear in the ship-traffic table.

The eight measures

Nominal capacity
— the maximum sustainable number of transits a day that the operating authority states — the capacity the gateway was designed for
Effective capacity
— the daily cap, restrictions and outages in force — what present conditions permit
Reservable capacity
— booking slots offered per day and the share booked — what a user can actually reserve
Waiting time
— time spent in the gateway's waters as the authority publishes it, for all traffic (for Panama, Canal Waters Time, which includes the transit itself); where no statistics are published, it is read on observed queue evidence
Cost of secured passage
— what securing passage costs beyond the standard tariff: auction premiums, surcharges, war-risk cover
Allocation rules
— how scarce access is allocated — booking windows, auctions, convoy scheduling, security routing
Access uniformity
— whether access terms are equal for every user or depend on who the user is
Recovery flexibility
— the published rules for recovering a failed or changed arrangement: substitution, transfer, cancellation terms, rebooking priority, rerouting options

“Not applicable”: the dimension does not exist under the gateway's regime; it carries no direction and is left out of the count. “No comparison”: the dimension was not applicable in the previous edition, or the allocation regime changed; it is left out of that month's count.

Change, not level

In this launch edition each measure carries a direction word — improving, stable or deteriorating; in this page’s summaries, better, stable or worse — with a one-line reason, following launch-edition conventions that are not comparable with later editions. The counts show direction, not severity. Severity is read from traffic against the reference level and the access state of the ship-traffic table. Stable means a count in whole units (slots or transits a day) that did not change, another quantity that moved by less than 5%, or governing rule text that did not change; where findings within a measure conflict, the direction follows the finding that binds passage for the marginal unreserved user, and the conflict is stated (methodology §4).

Not a score or a ranking

The counts are not a score, a rating or a ranking, and they are not comparable between chokepoints. The Monitor publishes no composite score, no ranking of chokepoints and no numeric forecast; each outlook is qualitative and states its basis. Readings are observed — based on published operational evidence, not private booking outcomes — and they do not enter the Logistics Growth Index (LGI).

How passage is allocated, and for whom

Each fully assessed chokepoint carries one allocation-regime tag; the access state in the ship-traffic table is a short description, not a tag. The tags are not ranked from best to worst, and a change of tag is not by itself an improvement or a deterioration. Where more than one mechanism operates, the tag is the mechanism through which the operating authority allocates passage, and any security constraint is named as secondary.

Unconstrained
— passage is not rationed
Queue-rationed
— ships wait their turn in a queue
Convoy-scheduled
— ships pass in scheduled convoys
Reservation-rationed
— passage is rationed through limited daily booking slots; with the modifier auction-binding, standard booking slots are exhausted and additional slots are allocated by auction
Security-constrained
— the security situation is the main limit on passage

Access uniformity — whether every ship gets the same terms — is graded on a fixed ladder of decreasing predictability. Published rules and observed practice are both read, and the published rung is the lower of the two; “both” means the rung is seen in published rules and in observed practice.

Uniform
— the same terms for every user
Rule-differentiated
— transparent rules differentiate by price, vessel class, cargo type or booking window
Identity-conditional
— access varies by flag, affiliation, ownership or destination
Permissioned-discretionary
— access is granted case by case

Reference levels

This launch edition compares every chokepoint with June 2023. The counts are monthly means computed by WRI from IMF PortWatch’s daily counts, with no seasonal adjustment.

Codes and abbreviations

A-numbers (A-36, A-36-2026)
— Panama Canal Authority advisories to shipping, numbered within the year: A-36-2026 is advisory 36 of 2026; N-numbers are its notices to shipping
ACP
— Autoridad del Canal de Panamá — the Panama Canal Authority
Canal Waters Time (CWT)
— the ACP's published time ships spend in canal waters — waiting plus the transit itself
Queue Planning Ratio (QPR)
— a WRI supplementary indicator for Panama: how much worse the month's highest published Canal Waters Time was than the average day's, after subtracting the in-transit time
Neopanamax, Panamax
— vessel classes sized for the Panama Canal's expanded locks (opened 2016) and for its original locks
LoTSA
— Long-Term Slot Allocation — one of the ACP's booking periods
TTA
— Total TEU Allowance — the container-capacity measure the ACP's booking rules use to allocate container-ship slots
TFW
— Tropical Fresh Water — the reference in which Panama's maximum draft is stated
Gatun Lake
— the reservoir that supplies the water for the Panama Canal's locks
AIS
— Automatic Identification System — the position signals ships broadcast; ship-tracking counts are built from them, and a ship with its transponder off is not seen at first count
IMF PortWatch
— the International Monetary Fund's platform that publishes daily transit counts at chokepoints from AIS data (sources: Kpler; UN Global Platform)
Vintage (PortWatch vintage)
— the date a data series was retrieved — for PortWatch, the daily transit series; later vintages revise earlier days
Kpler
— a commercial ship-tracking data company, one of PortWatch's named sources
SCA
— Suez Canal Authority
BeM
— Bab el-Mandeb — the strait at the southern entrance to the Red Sea
UKMTO
— United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations — a Royal Navy centre that issues incident warnings to merchant shipping; warning numbers carry the year (146-26 is warning 146 of 2026)
VRA
— Voluntary Reporting Area — the sea area in which UKMTO asks merchant ships to report
JMIC
— Joint Maritime Information Center — the Combined Maritime Forces' centre that publishes threat advisories for shipping
MARAD, MSCI
— the US Maritime Administration, which issues US maritime security advisories through its Maritime Security Communications with Industry (MSCI) portal, numbered by year (2026-011)
NAVCENT, NCAGS
— US Naval Forces Central Command, and its Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping function, which coordinates with merchant ships
CENTCOM
— US Central Command
Aspides
— EUNAVFOR Aspides — the European Union's naval operation that protects and escorts merchant ships in the Red Sea area
HOCC
— Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center — the Houthi-run body that addresses notices to shipping
EEAS
— European External Action Service — the EU's diplomatic service
PGSA
— Persian Gulf Strait Authority — the Iranian body that issues case-by-case permits for passage of the Strait of Hormuz
IRGC
— Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps; the IRGC Navy is its naval arm
OFAC
— the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (sanctions)
IMO
— International Maritime Organization, the UN agency for shipping; “IMO” followed by a seven-digit number is a ship's IMO identification number
NAVAREA IX
— the international navigational-warning area that includes the Strait of Hormuz; its warnings are issued by the Pakistan Navy Hydrographic Department as area coordinator
JWC / LMA
— the Joint War Committee of the Lloyd's Market Association, which lists areas of heightened war risk for marine insurance
Gemini (AE5, AE11, AE12, ME2 …)
— the Gemini Cooperation of Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd; AE5, AE11, AE12 and ME2 are codes of its container services
MSC
— Mediterranean Shipping Company, the container line; in “Oman MSC”, Oman's Maritime Security Centre
LNG, LPG
— liquefied natural gas, liquefied petroleum gas
VLCC
— very large crude carrier — a supertanker
Baltic TD3C, MEG, TCE
— the Baltic Exchange's TD3C assessment of very large crude carrier freight from the Middle East Gulf (MEG) to China; TCE, time-charter equivalent, states freight as earnings per day
STS
— ship-to-ship transfer of cargo at sea
RoRo
— roll-on/roll-off ships, which carry vehicles driven on and off
DG
— dangerous goods — hazardous cargo
TEU
— twenty-foot equivalent unit — the standard measure of container capacity
bpd, mb/d
— barrels per day, million barrels per day
NOAA CPC
— the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Climate Prediction Center
ENSO
— El Niño–Southern Oscillation — the Pacific climate cycle of El Niño and La Niña conditions
IMHPA
— Panama's Institute of Meteorology and Hydrology (Instituto de Meteorología e Hidrología de Panamá)
LSEG
— London Stock Exchange Group (its market-data service)
ETA, ETD
— estimated time of arrival, estimated time of departure
UTC
— Coordinated Universal Time

Full definitions: the Gateway Access Monitor methodology (current version).

Comparable core — monitored chokepoints

Ship traffic at seven chokepoints

The same measure at every chokepoint: daily ship transits counted by IMF PortWatch from ship-tracking (AIS) signals

  • Panama Canal29.0 a day*

    −5% against its June 2023 level of 30.6

    Auction-rationed, cuts announced

    Previous month 32.2

  • Suez Canal41.4 a day*

    −45% against its June 2023 level of 75.3

    Security-constrained

    Previous month 41.9

  • Bab el-Mandeb27.5 a day*

    −64% against its June 2023 level of 76.5

    Security-constrained, worsening

    Previous month 33.6

  • Strait of Hormuz4.8 a day*

    −95% against its June 2023 level of 102

    Identity-conditional access

    Previous month 10.2

  • Malacca Strait211.2 a day*

    −3% against its June 2023 level of 218.6

    Unconstrained

    Previous month 224.9

  • Gibraltar Strait128.4 a day*

    −14% against its June 2023 level of 148.8

    Unconstrained (flow shift)

    Previous month 127.9

  • Cape of Good Hope90.6 a day*

    +76% against its June 2023 level of 51.6

    Diversion route (mirror)

    Previous month 91.5

* Month to date — daily AIS calls to 30 August 2026, the latest day in the PortWatch vintage retrieved 7 September 2026; PortWatch updates weekly and revises earlier days, and reference values are recomputed from the current vintage at each edition. Sources: Kpler; UN Global Platform; IMF PortWatch (portwatch.imf.org) — used under the IMF’s Use of IMF Data terms. WRI’s monthly means: Panama series (CSV) · provenance.

Panama Canal

How passage is allocated
Auction-rationed — passage is rationed by booking, with additional slots allocated by auction (launch-edition tag, re-labelled under Methodology v1.0 with no change in how passage is allocated)
Same terms for every ship?
Rule-differentiated (both: in published rules and in observed practice) — transparent rules differentiate by price, vessel class, cargo type or booking window
Direction (launch edition)
7 of 8 applicable measures worse; 1 stable — nominal capacityHeadline reading: 7 of 8 applicable access dimensions deteriorating · observed reading — based on published operational evidence, not private booking outcomes

In brief

Slots cut to 9/day Neopanamax + 25/day Panamax for booking dates from 4 Sep, then 23/day Panamax from 15 Sep; record ≈US$5.3M auction premium on 24 Aug (press-reported).

Direction by dimension

8 applicable — launch-edition conventions, not comparable with later editions · what each measure means

  • Nominal Capacity — stable: The Panama Canal Authority states the maximum sustainable capacity for Panamax and Neopanamax locks combined is approximately 36-38 vessels per day
  • Effective Capacity — deteriorating (worse): AIS-derived data shows mean daily transits between 27.9 and 30.6 in late July/early August 2026, well below nominal capacity
  • Reservable Capacity — deteriorating (worse): Effective August 21, 2026, Neopanamax reservable slots were reduced to 9 per day across all booking periods (1 Special, 3 LoTSA, 3 Period 1/1A, 1 Period 2, 1 Auction)
  • Waiting Time — deteriorating (worse): Unreserved Neopanamax vessels face 10-11 day waits, while Panamax Super-class vessels wait 13-25 days
  • Cost of secured passage — deteriorating (worse): Auction premiums escalated through August — press-reported ~US$4.0M (10 Aug), US$4.6M (12 Aug) and a US$5.3M record (24 Aug, confirmed to press as the highest ever by the ACP's designated administrator)
  • Allocation Rules — deteriorating (worse): Access is allocated via a complex multi-period reservation system (Special, LoTSA, Periods 1-3) plus daily auctions
  • Access Uniformity — deteriorating (worse): Access is primarily rule-differentiated via transparent auction and booking windows, but U.S
  • Recovery Flexibility — deteriorating (worse): Last-Minute service suspended and substitutions restricted (A-28-2026); the late-cancellation surcharge scheduled for 1 September was postponed until further notice before taking effect (A-32-2026, 2 Sep)

Codes and names in this section: A-25 to A-33: Panama Canal Authority advisories to shipping · ACP: the Panama Canal Authority · Neopanamax, Panamax: ship classes for the canal's 2016 and original locks · LoTSA: the ACP's Long-Term Slot Allocation booking period · Gatun Lake: the reservoir that feeds the canal's locks · AIS: the position signals ships broadcast · OFAC: US Treasury sanctions office · IMO: International Maritime Organization; with seven digits, a ship's number · LNG, LPG: liquefied natural gas, liquefied petroleum gas · NOAA CPC: the US Climate Prediction Center · ENSO: El Niño–Southern Oscillation.

Daily capacity: stated, booking slots offered and ships observed

Nominal capacity
36–38/day
Announced from 4 Sep
34/day
Announced from 15 Sep
32/day
Observed transits (Aug, AIS)
29.0/day
Oceangoing transits per dayACP monthly averagenominal 36–38243036Jul 202634.0Canal Waters Time, hourswaiting + transit204060Jul 202625.42023202420252026
Panama Canal Authority (ACP) monthly averages since January 2023: oceangoing transits per day and Canal Waters Time in hours. The ACP’s own count of oceangoing transits is a different population from the ship-tracking (AIS) count in the traffic table. Data: Panama series (CSV).Series break, February 2024: the Panama Canal Authority did not publish a Monthly Canal Operations Summary for that month; the line resumes with the March 2024 advisory.

Key figures

Open a figure for its full text and its source, where linked.

  • Canal Waters Time

    25.4h in July (monthly high 41.1h) after an April–May spike to 31–32h against a ~20h 2025 baseline.

  • Booking posture (July)

    Neopanamax bookings ran at 112% of offered slots (183 used / 163 offered); auctioned slots 247 used / 306 offered. December 2025 auction usage hit 132% of offered.

  • Cost of secured passage

    Record ≈US$5.3M auction premium (auction 24 Aug; press-reported — Bloomberg 25 Aug; confirmed to press as the highest ever by the ACP's designated administrator on 28 Aug; the ACP publishes auction volumes and a registered-access bid distribution, not individual winning bids). Prior record US$4.6M (~12 Aug). Neopanamax average ≈US$2.5M (Argus, press-reported).

  • Announced measures

    A-29-2026 (20 Aug): Neopanamax slots to 9/day and Panamax to 25/day (total 34) for booking dates from 4 Sep, stepping to 23/day Panamax (total 32) from 15 Sep; Neopanamax Conditioned slots withdrawn. The same advisory postponed A-25-2026's draft steps: maximum Neopanamax draft 14.63 m (48.0 ft) in force since 2 Sep; A-33-2026 (4 Sep) postpones the 14.48 m (47.5 ft) step previously scheduled for 1 Oct until further notice, citing Gatun Lake levels and weather projections. A-31-2026 (issued 28 Aug, effective 30 Aug for booking dates from 13 Sep) revises Neopanamax slot allocation — per-customer and consecutive-date limits lifted, 63 Neopanamax slots a week with segment minimums; it post-dates this edition's data cut and governs from the September edition.

  • Access uniformity

    Transparent, published rules differentiate by vessel class, booking tier and willingness-to-pay; no identity-based differentiation evident. Gatekeepers: ACP; insurer collectives; OFAC (extraterritorial).

  • Watch

    Hydrology, not demand, is the binding constraint.

  • Advisory count (automated title screen)

    12 ACP advisories in 2026 to date whose titles carry booking, slot, draft, auction, reservation or cancellation terms — an activity count from an automated screen of advisory titles, not a count of rule changes; titles without those terms are not captured (A-29-2026, which cut slots and postponed the draft steps, is not counted). 2025: 12; 2023: 32. Advisories counted (CSV)

  • Recovery flexibility

    Narrowing — flexibility services (date changes, substitutions, transit-in-advance) restricted and the Last-Minute service suspended (A-28-2026). The late-cancellation surcharge (tariff 1050.IBC9) that A-28 scheduled for 1 September was postponed until further notice before taking effect (A-32-2026, 2 Sep). A-30-2026 (25 Aug) moves cancelled slots into a Special Competition and codifies swap and substitution eligibility.

Reported auction prices

Documented auction outcomes (record, not a series — carries no direction)

Documented auction outcomes: auction date, vessel, segment, premium in US dollars, report status, Panama Canal Authority status and the rules in force
AuctionVesselSegmentPremium (US$)Report statusACP statusRules in force
8 April 2026Gas VirgoLPG4,000,000press-reportedACP acknowledged results above US$1M; figure not confirmedpre-A-28 (Notice N-7-2026 booking rules)
10 August 2026Seaspan BenefactorFull container4,000,000press-reported (approximate: 'about US$4 million')ACP declined commentpre-A-28
12 August 2026G. AreteLPG4,600,000press-reported (brokers/traders)nonepre-A-28 (A-28 issued 20 Aug)
24 August 2026G. Spirit (IMO 9797876)LPG5,300,000press-reported (Bloomberg; 'people familiar')confirmed as highest ever to press by designated administrator (Panama America/AFP 28 Aug); no ACP documentA-28 in force; A-29 slot cuts announced (4 Sep/15 Sep); A-31 not yet issued

Outlook

Outlook — hydrological. NOAA CPC assigns >90% probability of a very strong El Niño persisting into 2027; ACP reports cumulative watershed rainfall 34% below and inflows 44% below historical averages for the May–August hydrological year, and names the January–April 2027 dry season as the concern window. Directionally: further slot and draft reductions are more likely than relief.

Sources for this assessment

Sources: ACP Advisories to Shipping (A-25/26/28/29/30/31-2026, retrieved 23–30 Aug; A-32-2026, 2 Sep), ACP Monthly Canal Operations Summaries (parsed Feb 2022–Jul 2026), IMF PortWatch daily transit calls, NOAA CPC ENSO advisory.

Suez Canal / Red Sea

How passage is allocated
Security-constrained — the security situation is the main limit on passage
Same terms for every ship?
Rule-differentiated (both: in published rules and in observed practice) — transparent rules differentiate by price, vessel class, cargo type or booking window
Direction (launch edition)
3 of 7 applicable measures worse — effective capacity, cost of secured passage and access uniformity; 4 stableHeadline reading: 3 of 7 applicable access dimensions deteriorating · observed reading — based on published operational evidence, not private booking outcomes

In brief

~55% of pre-crisis traffic; Cape diversion running +76% over baseline; war-risk 1–2% of hull (press-reported).

Direction by dimension

7 applicable — launch-edition conventions, not comparable with later editions · what each measure means

Not applicable here, so not counted: reservable capacity.

  • Nominal Capacity — stable: SCA's official specifications state the canal's 24-hour sustainable capacity at 97 standard ships following the 2015 New Suez Canal expansion, which added a 35 km parallel channel enabling simultaneous two-way traffic
  • Effective Capacity — deteriorating (worse): IMF PortWatch AIS-derived data shows transits averaging 40.9-41.4 vessels/day in August 2026, representing only 42% utilization of design capacity
  • Waiting Time — stable: Total operational timeline from approach to departure is typically 36-64 hours, comprising 24-48 hours for documentation/convoy assignment and 12-16 hours actual transit
  • Cost of secured passage — deteriorating (worse): War-risk insurance is the effective access price — press-reported rising from ~0.3% to 1-3% of hull from late July and hardening through August as underwriters withdrew or repriced cover; the SCA runs no priority pricing
  • Allocation Rules — stable: Access is allocated through SCA's convoy booking system on a first-come, first-served basis within 48-96 hour advance booking windows
  • Access Uniformity — deteriorating (worse): Access is formally rule-differentiated by vessel class (toll structure), timing compliance (late arrival penalties), and booking lead time
  • Recovery Flexibility — stable: De jure rules permit cancellation with >12 hours notice without penalty; ≤12 hours notice incurs USD 1,000-3,000 fees depending on vessel size; after enlistment, USD 5,000 fee applies

Codes and names in this section: AIS: the position signals ships broadcast · Vintage: the date a data series was retrieved · SCA: Suez Canal Authority · MARAD, MSCI: US Maritime Administration (MSCI: its security advisories) · JWC / LMA: Lloyd's market committee listing war-risk areas.

Key figures

Open a figure for its full text.

  • Transits

    41.4/day (Aug) vs 75 pre-crisis observed and an SCA-stated 97/day design capacity — a plateau near half of normal for more than two years.

  • The diversion mirror

    Cape of Good Hope traffic 90.6/day vs 51.6 baseline (+76%) — the rerouted cohort, visible daily.

  • Bab el-Mandeb

    27.5/day in August — a new low, still deteriorating.

  • Reservable capacity

    Not applicable — the SCA operates convoy scheduling, not slot booking; no reservation product exists.

  • Cost of secured passage

    The access price is war-risk insurance — 1–2% of hull value southern Red Sea (press-reported), differentiated by affiliation.

  • Access uniformity

    Israeli-linked vessels de facto barred; elevated targeting of US-flagged tonnage; underwriters screen affiliation. Gatekeepers: Houthi forces (non-state), Lloyd's JWC/LMA (collective conditions), SCA (formally neutral), US/EU/UK sanctions authorities.

  • Recovery flexibility

    Convoy rescheduling only — a missed slot waits for the next day's convoy; no substitution or rebooking-priority rights are published by the SCA. Cancellation fees are published in agents' schedules, not an open SCA table.

Outlook

Outlook — none announced. No SCA forward-dated changes as of 23 Aug; carrier returns remain the swing variable and are decided outside the canal authority. Monitorable, not forecastable.

Sources for this assessment

Sources: SCA statements, IMF PortWatch (Suez, Bab el-Mandeb, Cape series), MARAD advisory 2026-006, carrier advisories, press-reported war-risk levels. PortWatch figures (headline and comparable-core row) from the 3 Sep 2026 vintage (daily series to 30 Aug); the 26 Aug vintage read 40.3 and the 29 Aug vintage 40.9.

Strait of Hormuz

How passage is allocated
Security-constrained — the security situation is the main limit on passage
Same terms for every ship?
Identity-conditional (both: in published rules and in observed practice) — access varies by flag, affiliation, ownership or destination
Direction (launch edition)
All 6 applicable measures worseHeadline reading: 6 of 6 applicable access dimensions deteriorating · observed reading — based on published operational evidence, not private booking outcomes

In brief

~3% of pre-war traffic; access via Iranian permits or US-escorted convoys; ~135 vessels holding.

Direction by dimension

6 applicable — launch-edition conventions, not comparable with later editions · what each measure means

Not applicable here, so not counted: nominal capacity and reservable capacity.

  • Effective Capacity — deteriorating (worse): IMF PortWatch AIS-derived daily transit calls averaged 2.4/day (wk 7/20), 3.9/day (7/27), 4.4/day (8/03), and 3.6/day (8/10), versus a pre-war baseline of about 138 vessels/day reported by JMIC
  • Waiting Time — deteriorating (worse): Vessel clusters loiter on both sides with many refraining from transiting while the blockade redirects or boards non-compliant traffic — the transit-time penalty for unfacilitated traffic is effectively indeterminate
  • Cost of secured passage — deteriorating (worse): The effective access price is war-risk insurance — press-reported climbing from ~3% of hull in March to 7.5-10% by late July (vs 1-3% pre-crisis), with Iranian transit fees reported at US$150k-2M — no auction exists
  • Allocation Rules — deteriorating (worse): Access is allocated by security coordination, not market mechanism — southern transits NAVCENT/NCAGS-coordinated (MARAD 2026-004), the blockade (reimposed 14 July) redirecting or disabling non-compliant vessels
  • Access Uniformity — deteriorating (worse): Traffic is identity-gated — the northern corridor dominated by Iranian- and Chinese-linked vessels, southern transits US-facilitated; Iran's stated terms ban US/Israeli vessels and fine up to 20% of cargo value
  • Recovery Flexibility — deteriorating (worse): Options narrowed — the US blockade was reimposed 14 July, JMIC raised the threat level to SEVERE and carriers extended suspensions; no booking system exists, so there are no published rebooking or transfer rights

Codes and names in this section: AIS: the position signals ships broadcast · UKMTO: UK Maritime Trade Operations (Royal Navy) · JMIC: Joint Maritime Information Center · MARAD, MSCI: US Maritime Administration (MSCI: its security advisories) · NAVCENT, NCAGS: US Naval Forces Central Command and its shipping-guidance cell · PGSA: the Iranian body issuing Hormuz passage permits · OFAC: US Treasury sanctions office · JWC / LMA: Lloyd's market committee listing war-risk areas.

Key figures

Open a figure for its full text.

  • Transits

    Weekly means 2.4–4.5/day (Jul–Aug) vs ~130 pre-war — ≈3% of baseline; maritime-intelligence estimates put 60–80% of residual transits AIS-dark, so AIS counts are a floor.

  • Nominal / reservable capacity

    Not applicable — no design capacity is published for a strait and no booking mechanism exists.

  • Waiting

    No formal queue; ~135 vessels holding position; Cape diversion adds 10–14 days per leg.

  • Cost of secured passage

    War-risk 3–10% of hull value per transit (press-reported); Iranian transit fees reported US$150k–$2M.

  • Access uniformity

    Access runs through two identity-gated channels — Iran's Persian Gulf Strait Authority permits (fourth Iraqi waiver granted 22 Aug; Israel-linked banned; alignment-differentiated) or US-escorted night convoys (NAVCENT coordination). Paying Iran's fee is OFAC-sanctionable and voids Lloyd's war-risk cover — compliance with one gatekeeper breaches the other.

  • Affected classes

    Advantaged — Iran-linked, PGSA-permitted, US-convoy-coordinated; disadvantaged — US/Israel/allied-linked, unaffiliated tonnage without crisis-priced cover.

  • Recovery flexibility

    No booking system exists, so recovery means rerouting — NCAGS guidance and the Cape of Good Hope alternative; carrier transit suspensions (Maersk, since June) narrow the options in practice.

Outlook

Outlook — announced. JMIC's 20 August assessment expects traffic to remain at reduced levels in both directions; the Iran–Oman safe-passage framework remains unimplemented.

Sources for this assessment

Sources: IMF PortWatch, UKMTO/JMIC advisories, Reuters (22 Aug Iraqi-tanker permission), LMA transit-fee condition (23 Jul), press-reported premia.

Records and transparency

Transparency scorecard

Who publishes what

Transparency scorecard: what is published for each gateway on capacity, transits, booking or slots, waiting, priority price and rules
GatewayCapacityTransitsBooking/slotsWaitingPriority priceRules
Panama (ACP)StatedMonthly PDFOffered vs used, by classCWT monthlyVolumes only; prices press/paidPublished advisories
Suez (SCA)StatedQuarterly/annualNo productNot publishedn/a (insurance market)Circulars
Hormuzn/aAIS onlyOpaque permitsNot publishedPress-reportedUnpublished/discretionary
Hub ports—AIS port callsContractual, privateRotterdam only——

About this monitor

The Gateway Access Monitor applies WRI’s Logistics Access Reliability framework, which distinguishes the capacity infrastructure was designed for, the capacity present conditions permit, the capacity users can actually book, and whether booked capacity is delivered at a predictable time and cost. Each chokepoint is assessed monthly across eight dimensions — nominal, effective and reservable capacity; waiting time; cost of secured passage; allocation rules; access uniformity; and recovery flexibility — under a fixed allocation-regime taxonomy (regime tags re-labelled under Methodology v1.0 carry no change in how passage is allocated), combining AIS-derived transit data (IMF PortWatch, daily) with the operating authorities’ primary publications. Every figure is checked against its cited source before publication and carries an evidence label (primary-published, derived, third-party estimate, WRI floor or range, or press-reported). Access uniformity is shown with its basis — published rules, observed practice, or both. Direction counts movement since the previous edition; the severity of access is read from the level against its reference, the access state and the stability columns — a gateway can be stable at a severely impaired level. Readings are observational — based on published operational evidence, not private booking outcomes. The Gateway Access Monitor is a companion series to the Logistics Growth Index (LGI) and does not enter the computation of any LGI reading.

The World Research Institute (WRI) — the intelligence and research arm of the World Certification Institute (WCI) — publishes the monthly Logistics Growth Index (LGI). Its World and regional readings are published openly at intelligence.worldresearch.org/lgi. Updated with each monthly edition. Media: media@worldresearch.org.